Method to protect software against unwanted use with a “elementary functions” principle

ABSTRACT

The invention concerns a process to protect a vulnerable software working on a data processing system against its unauthorized usage using a processing and memorizing unit. The process comprises defining: 1) a set of elementary functions whose elementary functions are liable to be executed in a processing and memorizing unit 2) a set of elementary commands, said elementary commands being liable to be executed in the data processing system and to trigger the execution in a processing and memorizing unit, of the elementary functions 3) exploitation means designed to be used in a processing and memorizing unit during a usage phase, and enabling to execute the elementary functions of said set.

BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION

This invention concerns the technical domain of data processing systemsin the general sense, and is more precisely aimed at the means ofprotecting software running on said data processing systems againstunauthorized usage.

The subject of the invention aims in particular at the means ofprotecting software against unauthorized usage, using a processing andmemorizing unit, such a unit being commonly materialized by a chip cardor a material key on USB port.

In the technical domain above, the main problem concerns theunauthorized usage of software by users who have not paid the licenserights. This illicit use of software causes an obvious loss for softwareeditors, software distributors and/or any person integrating suchsoftware in products. To avoid such illicit copies, various solutions,in the state of technology, have been proposed to protect software.

Thus, a protection solution is known, which makes use of a hardwareprotection system, such as a physical component named protection key or“dongle”. Such a protection key should guarantee that the softwareexecutes only in presence of the key. Yet, it must be acknowledged thatthis solution is ineffective because it presents the inconvenience ofbeing easy to bypass. An ill-intentioned person or a hacker can, withthe aid of specialized tools such as disassemblers, delete the controlinstructions of the protection key. It becomes then possible to makeillicit copies corresponding to modified versions of the software ableto run without the protection. Moreover, this solution cannot begeneralized to all software, inasmuch as it is difficult to connect morethan two protection keys to the same system.

BRIEF SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION

The subject of the invention aims precisely at finding a solution to theaforementioned problems by proposing a process to protect a softwareagainst unauthorized usage, using an ad hoc processing and memorizingunit, inasmuch as the presence of such a unit is necessary for thesoftware to be completely functional.

So as to reach such a goal, the subject of the invention concerns aprocess to protect, using at least one blank unit including at leastprocessing means and memorization means, a vulnerable software againstits unauthorized usage, said vulnerable software being produced from asource and working on a data processing system. The process according tothe invention comprises:

-   -   during a protection phase:        -   defining:            -   a set of elementary functions whose elementary functions                are liable to be executed in a unit,            -   and a set of elementary commands for said set of                elementary functions, said elementary commands being                liable to be executed in the data processing system and                to trigger the execution in a unit, of the elementary                functions,        -   constructing exploitation means enabling to transform the            blank unit into a unit able to execute the elementary            functions of said set, the execution of said elementary            functions being triggered by the execution in the data            processing system, of the elementary commands,        -   creating a protected software:            -   by choosing, at least one algorithmic processing which,                during the execution of the vulnerable software, uses at                least one operand and enables to obtain at least one                result,            -   by choosing at least one portion of the source of the                vulnerable software containing at least one chosen                algorithmic processing,            -   by producing a source of the protected software from the                source of the vulnerable software, by modifying at least                one chosen portion of the source of the vulnerable                software to obtain at least one modified portion of the                source of the protected software, this modification                being such that:                -   during the execution of the protected software a                    first execution part is executed in the data                    processing system and a second execution part is                    executed in a unit, obtained from the blank unit                    after upload of information,                -   the second execution part executes at least the                    functionality of at least one chosen algorithmic                    processing,                -   at least one chosen algorithmic processing is split                    so that during the execution of the protected                    software, said algorithmic processing is executed by                    means of the second execution part, using elementary                    functions,                -   for at least one chosen algorithmic processing,                    elementary commands are integrated to the source of                    the protected software, so that during the execution                    of the protected software, each elementary command                    is executed by the first execution part and triggers                    in the unit, the execution by means of the second                    execution part, of an elementary function,                -   and a sequence of the elementary commands is chosen                    among the set of sequences allowing the execution of                    the protected software,            -   and by producing:                -   a first object part of the protected software, from                    the source of the protected software, said first                    object part being such that during the execution of                    the protected software, appears a first execution                    part which is executed in the data processing system                    and whose at least a portion takes into account that                    the elementary commands are executed according to                    the chosen sequence,                -   and a second object part of the protected software,                    containing the exploitation means, said second                    object part being such that, after upload to the                    blank unit and during the execution of the protected                    software, appears the second execution part by means                    of which are executed the elementary functions                    triggered by the first execution part,        -   and uploading the second object part to the blank unit, with            the intention of obtaining the unit,    -   and during a usage phase during which the protected software is        executed:        -   in the presence of the unit and each time an elementary            command contained in a portion of the first execution part            imposes it, executing the corresponding elementary function            in the unit, so that said portion is executed correctly and            that, consequently, the protected software is completely            functional,        -   and in the absence of the unit, in spite of the request by a            portion of the first execution part to trigger the execution            of an elementary function in the unit, not being able to            fulfill said request correctly, so that at least said            portion is not executed correctly and that, consequently,            the protected software is not completely functional.

According to a preferred embodiment, the process according to theinvention comprises:

-   -   during the protection phase:        -   modifying the protected software:            -   by choosing at least one variable used in at least one                chosen algorithmic processing, which during the                execution of the protected software, partially defines                the state of the protected software,            -   by modifying at least one chosen portion of the source                of the protected software, this modification being such                that during the execution of the protected software, at                least one chosen variable or at least one copy of chosen                variable resides in the unit,            -   and by producing:                -   the first object part of the protected software,                    said first object part being such that during the                    execution of the protected software, at least one                    portion of the first execution part takes also into                    account that at least one variable or at least one                    copy of variable resides in the unit,                -   and the second object part of the protected                    software, said second object part being such that,                    after upload to the unit and during the execution of                    the protected software, appears the second execution                    part by means of which at least one chosen variable,                    or at least one copy of chosen variable resides too                    in the unit,    -   and during the usage phase:        -   in the presence of the unit each time a portion of the first            execution part imposes it, using a variable or a copy of            variable residing in the unit, so that said portion is            executed correctly and that, consequently, the protected            software is completely functional,        -   and in the absence of the unit, in spite of the request by a            portion of the first execution part to use a variable or a            copy of variable residing in the unit, not being able to            fulfill said request correctly, so that at least said            portion is not executed correctly and that, consequently the            protected software is not completely functional.

According to another preferred embodiment, the process according to theinvention comprises:

-   -   during the protection phase:        -   defining:            -   at least one software execution characteristic, liable                to be monitored at least in part in the unit,            -   at least one criterion to abide by for at least one                software execution characteristic,            -   detection means to implement in the unit and enabling to                detect that at least one software execution                characteristic does not abide by at least one associated                criterion,            -   and coercion means to implement in the unit and enabling                to inform the data processing system and/or modify the                execution of a software, when at least one criterion is                not abided by,        -   constructing the exploitation means enabling the unit, to            also implement the detection means and the coercion means,        -   and modifying the protected software:            -   by choosing at least one software execution                characteristic to monitor, among the software execution                characteristics liable to be monitored,            -   by choosing at least one criterion to abide by for at                least one chosen software execution characteristic,            -   by choosing in the source of the protected software,                elementary functions for which at least one chosen                software execution characteristic is to be monitored,            -   by modifying at least one chosen portion of the source                of the protected software, this modification being such                that during the execution of the protected software, at                least one chosen execution characteristic is monitored                by means of the second execution part, and the fact that                a criterion is not abided by leads to the data                processing system being informed and/or to a                modification of the execution of the protected software,            -   and by producing the second object part of the protected                software containing the exploitation means also                implementing the detection means and the coercion means,                said second object part being such that, after upload to                the unit and during the execution of the protected                software, at least one software execution characteristic                is monitored and the fact that a criterion is not abided                by leads to the data processing system being informed                and/or to a modification of the execution of the                protected software,    -   and during the usage phase:        -   in the presence of the unit:            -   as long as all the criteria corresponding to all the                monitored execution characteristics of all the modified                portions of the protected software are abided by,                enabling said portions of the protected software to work                nominally and consequently enabling the protected                software to work nominally,            -   and if at least one of the criteria corresponding to a                monitored execution characteristic of a portion of the                protected software is not abided by, informing the data                processing system of it and/or modifying the functioning                of the portion of the protected software, so that the                functioning of the protected software is modified.

According to a variant embodiment, the process according to theinvention comprises:

-   -   during the protection phase:        -   defining:            -   as software execution characteristic liable to be                monitored, a variable of measurement of the usage of a                functionality of a software,            -   as criterion to abide by, at least one threshold                associated to each variable of measurement,            -   and actualization means enabling to update at least one                variable of measurement,        -   constructing the exploitation means enabling the unit to            also implement the actualization means,        -   and modifying the protected software:            -   by choosing as software execution characteristic to                monitor, at least one variable of measurement of the                usage of at least one functionality of a software,            -   by choosing:                -   at least one functionality of the protected software                    whose usage is liable to be monitored using a                    variable of measurement,                -   at least one variable of measurement used to                    quantify the usage of said functionality,                -   at least one threshold associated to a chosen                    variable of measurement corresponding to a limit of                    usage of said functionality,                -   and at least one method of update of a chosen                    variable of measurement depending on the usage of                    said functionality,            -   and by modifying at least one chosen portion of the                source of the protected software, this modification                being such that, during the execution of the protected                software, the variable of measurement is actualized by                means of the second execution part depending on the                usage of said functionality, and at least one threshold                crossing is taken into account,    -   and during the usage phase, in the presence of the unit, and in        the case where at least one threshold crossing corresponding to        at least one limit of usage is detected, informing the data        processing system of it and/or modifying the functioning of the        portion of the protected software, so that the functioning of        the protected software is modified.

According to a variant embodiment, the process according to theinvention comprises:

-   -   during the protection phase:        -   defining:            -   for at least one variable of measurement, several                associated thresholds,            -   and different coercion means corresponding to each of                said thresholds,        -   and modifying the protected software:            -   by choosing in the source of the protected software, at                least one chosen variable of measurement to which must                be associated several thresholds corresponding to                different limits of usage of the functionality,            -   by choosing at least two thresholds associated to the                chosen variable of measurement,            -   and by modifying at least one chosen portion of the                source of the protected software, this modification                being such that, during the execution of the protected                software, the crossings of the various thresholds are                taken into account differently, by means of the second                execution part,    -   and during the usage phase:        -   in the presence of the unit:            -   in the case where the crossing of a first threshold is                detected, enjoining the protected software not to use                the corresponding functionality anymore,            -   and in the case where the crossing of a second threshold                is detected, making ineffective the corresponding                functionality and/or at least one portion of the                protected software.

According to a variant embodiment, the process according to theinvention comprises:

-   -   during the protection phase:        -   defining refilling means enabling to credit at least one            software functionality monitored by a variable of            measurement with at least one additional usage,        -   constructing the exploitation means also allowing the unit            to implement the refilling means,        -   and modifying the protected software:            -   by choosing in the source of the protected software, at                least one chosen variable of measurement enabling to                limit the usage of a functionality and which must be                able to be credited with at least one additional usage,            -   and by modifying at least one chosen portion, this                modification being such that during a phase called of                refilling, at least one additional usage of at least one                functionality corresponding to a chosen variable of                measurement can be credited,    -   and during the phase of refilling:        -   reactualizing at least one chosen variable of measurement            and/or at least one associated threshold, so as to allow at            least one additional usage of the functionality.

According to a variant embodiment, the process according to theinvention comprises:

-   -   during the protection phase:        -   defining:            -   as software execution characteristic liable to be                monitored, a profile of software usage,            -   and as criterion to abide by, at least one feature of                software execution,        -   and modifying the protected software:            -   by choosing as software execution characteristic to                monitor at least one profile of software usage,            -   by choosing at least one feature of execution by which                at least one chosen profile of usage must abide,            -   and by modifying at least one chosen portion of the                source of the protected software, this modification                being such that, during the execution of the protected                software, the second execution part abides by all the                chosen features of execution,    -   and during the usage phase in the presence of the unit, and in        the case where it is detected that at least one feature of        execution is not abided by, informing the data processing system        of it and/or modifying the functioning of the portion of the        protected software, so that the functioning of the protected        software is modified.

According to a variant embodiment, the process according to theinvention comprises:

-   -   during the protection phase:        -   defining:            -   an instructions set whose instructions are liable to be                executed in the unit,            -   a set of instructions commands for said instructions                set, said instructions commands being liable to be                executed in the data processing system and to trigger in                the unit the execution of the instructions,            -   as profile of usage, the chaining of the instructions,            -   as feature of execution, an expected chaining for the                execution of the instructions,            -   as detection means, means enabling to detect that the                chaining of the instructions does not correspond to the                expected one,            -   and as coercion means, means enabling to inform the data                processing system and/or to modify the functioning of                the portion of protected software when the chaining of                the instructions does not correspond to the expected                one,        -   constructing the exploitation means also enabling the unit            to execute the instructions of the instructions set, the            execution of said instructions being triggered by the            execution in the data processing system, of the instructions            commands,        -   and modifying the protected software:            -   by modifying at least one chosen portion of the source                of the protected software:                -   by transforming the elementary functions into                    instructions,                -   by specifying the chaining by which must abide at                    least some of the instructions during their                    execution in the unit,                -   and by transforming the elementary commands into                    instructions commands corresponding to the                    instructions used,    -   and during the usage phase, in the presence of the unit, in the        case where it is detected that the chaining of the instructions        executed in the unit does not correspond to the expected one,        informing the data processing system of it and/or modifying the        functioning of the portion of the protected software, so that        the functioning of the protected software is modified.

According to a variant embodiment, the process according to theinvention comprises:

-   during the protection phase:    -   defining:        -   as instructions set, an instructions set whose at least some            instructions work with registers and use at least one            operand with the intention of returning a result,        -   for at least some of the instructions working with            registers:            -   a part defining the functionality of the instruction,            -   and a part defining the expected chaining for the                execution of the instructions and including bits fields                corresponding to:                -   an identification field of the instruction,                -   and for each operand of the instruction:                -    a flag field,                -    and an expected identification field of the                    operand,        -   for each register belonging to the exploitation means and            used by the instructions set, a generated identification            field in which is automatically memorized the identification            of the last instruction which has returned its result in            said register,        -   as detection means, means enabling, during the execution of            an instruction, for each operand, when the flag field            imposes it, to check the equality of the generated            identification field corresponding to the register used by            said operand, and the expected identification field of the            origin of said operand,        -   and as coercion means, means enabling to modify the result            of the instructions, if at least one of the checked            equalities is false.

According to another preferred embodiment, the process according to theinvention comprises:

-   -   during the protection phase:        -   defining:            -   as a triggering command, an elementary command or an                instruction command,            -   as a dependent function, an elementary function or an                instruction,            -   as an order, at least one argument for a triggering                command, corresponding at least in part to the                information transmitted by the data processing system to                the unit, so as to trigger the execution of the                corresponding dependent function,            -   a method of renaming of the orders enabling to rename                the orders so as to obtain triggering commands with                renamed orders,            -   and restoring means designed to be used in the unit                during the usage phase, and enabling to restore the                dependent function to execute, from the renamed order,        -   constructing exploitation means enabling the unit to also            implement the restoring means,        -   and modifying the protected software:            -   by choosing in the source of the protected software,                triggering commands,            -   by modifying at least one chosen portion of the source                of the protected software by renaming the orders of the                chosen triggering commands, so as to conceal the                identity of the corresponding dependent functions,            -   and by producing:                -   the first object part of the protected software,                    said first object part being such that during the                    execution of the protected software, the triggering                    commands with renamed orders are executed,                -   and the second object part of the protected software                    containing the exploitation means also implementing                    the restoring means, said second object part being                    such that, after upload to the unit and during the                    execution of the protected software, the identity of                    the dependent functions whose execution is triggered                    by the first execution part is restored by means of                    the second execution part, and the dependent                    functions are executed by means of the second                    execution part,    -   and during the usage phase:        -   in the presence of the unit and each time a triggering            command with renamed order, contained in a portion of the            first execution part imposes it, restoring in the unit, the            identity of the corresponding dependent function and            executing it, so that said portion is executed correctly and            that, consequently, the protected software is completely            functional,        -   and in the absence of the unit, in spite of the request by a            portion of the first execution part, to trigger the            execution of a dependent function in the unit, not being            able to fulfill said request correctly, so that at least            said portion is not executed correctly and that,            consequently, the protected software is not completely            functional.

According to a variant embodiment, the process according to theinvention comprises:

-   -   during the protection phase:        -   defining for at least one dependent function, a family of            dependent functions algorithmically equivalent, but            triggered by triggering commands whose renamed orders are            different,        -   and modifying the protected software:            -   by choosing, in the source of the protected software at                least one triggering command with renamed order,            -   and by modifying at least one chosen portion of the                source of the protected software by replacing at least                the renamed order of one chosen triggering command with                renamed order, with another renamed order, triggering a                dependent function of the same family.

According to a variant embodiment, the process according to theinvention comprises:

-   -   during the protection phase, defining, for at least one        dependent function, a family of algorithmically equivalent        dependent functions:        -   by concatenating a field of noise to the information            defining the functional part of the dependent function to            execute in the unit,        -   or by using the identification field of the instruction and            the expected identification fields of the operands.

According to a variant embodiment, the process according to theinvention comprises:

-   -   during the protection phase:        -   defining:            -   as method of renaming of the orders, a ciphering method                to cipher the orders,            -   and as restoring means, means implementing a deciphering                method to decipher the renamed orders and thus restore                the identity of the dependent functions to execute in                the unit.

According to another preferred embodiment, the process according to theinvention comprises:

-   -   during the protection phase:        -   modifying the protected software:            -   by choosing, in the source of the protected software, at                least one conditional branch carried out in at least one                chosen algorithmic processing,            -   by modifying at least one chosen portion of the source                of the protected software, this modification being such                that during the execution of the protected software, the                functionality of at least one chosen conditional branch                is executed, by means of the second execution part, in                the unit,            -   and by producing:                -   the first object part of the protected software,                    said first object part being such that during the                    execution of the protected software, the                    functionality of at least one chosen conditional                    branch is executed in the unit,                -   and the second object part of the protected                    software, said second object part being such that,                    after upload to the unit and during the execution of                    the protected software, appears the second execution                    part by means of which the functionality of at least                    one chosen conditional branch is executed,    -   and during the usage phase:        -   in the presence of the unit and each time a portion of the            first execution part imposes it, executing the functionality            of at least one conditional branch in the unit, so that said            portion is executed correctly and that, consequently, the            protected software is completely functional,        -   and in the absence of the unit and in spite of the request            by a portion of the first execution part to execute the            functionality of a conditional branch in the unit, not being            able to fulfill said request correctly, so that at least            said portion is not executed correctly and that            consequently, the protected software is not completely            functional.

According to a variant embodiment, the process according to theinvention comprises, during the protection phase, modifying theprotected software:

-   -   by choosing, in the source of the protected software, at least        one series of chosen conditional branches,    -   by modifying at least one chosen portion of the source of the        protected software, this modification being such that during the        execution of the protected software, the overall functionality        of at least one chosen series of conditional branches is        executed, by means of the second execution part, in the unit,    -   and by producing:        -   the first object part of the protected software, said first            object part being such that during the execution of the            protected software, the functionality of at least one chosen            series of conditional branches is executed in the unit,        -   and the second object part of the protected software, said            second object part being such that, after upload to the unit            and during the execution of the protected software, appears            the second execution part by means of which the overall            functionality of at least one chosen series of conditional            branches is executed.

The process according to the invention thus enables to protect usage ofa software by using a processing and memorizing unit which presents thecharacteristic of containing a part of the software being executed. Itfollows that any derived version of the software attempting to workwithout the processing and memorizing unit imposes to recreate the partof the software contained in the processing and memorizing unit duringthe execution, or else said derived version of the software will not becompletely functional.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

Various other characteristics emerge from the description made below inreference to the appended diagrams which show, as non-limiting examples,embodiments and implementations of the subject of the invention.

FIGS. 10 and 11 are functional blocks diagrams illustrating the variousrepresentations of a software respectively not protected and protectedby the process in accordance with the invention.

FIGS. 20 to 22 illustrate as examples, various embodiments of anapparatus implementing the process in accordance with the invention.

FIGS. 30 and 31 are functional blocks diagrams making explicit thegeneral principle of the process in accordance with the invention.

FIGS. 40 to 43 are diagrams illustrating the protection processaccording to the invention implementing the principle of protection byvariable.

FIGS. 60 to 64 are diagrams illustrating the protection processaccording to the invention implementing the principle of protection byelementary functions.

FIGS. 70 to 74 are diagrams illustrating the protection processaccording to the invention implementing the principle of protection bydetection and coercion.

FIGS. 80 to 85 are diagrams illustrating the protection processaccording to the invention implementing the principle of protection bypar renaming.

FIGS. 90 to 92 are diagrams illustrating the protection processaccording to the invention implementing the principle of protection byconditional branch.

FIG. 100 is a diagram illustrating the different phases ofimplementation of the subject of the invention.

FIG. 110 illustrates an embodiment of a system allowing theimplementation of the construction stage of the protection phase inaccordance with the invention.

FIG. 120 illustrates an embodiment of a pre-customization unit used inthe protection process in accordance with the invention.

FIG. 130 illustrates an embodiment of a system allowing theimplementation of the tools making stage of the protection phase inaccordance with the invention.

FIG. 140 illustrates an embodiment of a system allowing theimplementation of the protection process according to the invention.

FIG. 150 illustrates an embodiment of a customization unit used in theprotection process in accordance with the invention.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE INVENTION

In the rest of the description, the following definitions will be used:

-   -   A data processing system 3 is a system able to execute a        program.    -   A processing and memorizing unit is a unit able:        -   to accept data provided by a data processing system 3,        -   to return data to the data processing system 3,        -   to store data at least partly in secret and to retain at            least a part of said data even if the unit is switched off,        -   and to carry out algorithmic processing on said data, part            or all of the result being secret.    -   A unit 6 is a processing and memorizing unit implementing the        process according to the invention.    -   A blank unit 60 is a unit which does not implement the process        according to the invention, but which can receive data        transforming it into a unit 6.    -   A pre-customized unit 66 is a blank unit 60 which has received        part of data enabling it, after reception of supplementary data,        to be transformed into a unit 6.    -   The upload of information to a blank unit 60 or a pre-customized        unit 66 corresponds to a transfer of information to the blank        unit 60 or the pre-customized unit 66, and to a storage of said        transferred information. The transfer can possibly include a        change of the information format.    -   A variable, a function or data contained in the data processing        system 3 will be indicated by an uppercase letter, while a        variable, a function or data contained in the unit 6 will be        indicated by a lowercase letter.    -   A “protected software”, is a software which has been protected        by at least one of the principles of protection implemented by        the process in accordance with the invention.    -   A “vulnerable software”, is a software which has not been        protected by any principle of protection implemented by the        process in accordance with the invention.    -   In the case where differentiation between a vulnerable software        and a protected software is not important, the term “software”        is used.    -   A software has various representations depending on the instant        considered in its life cycle:        -   a source representation,        -   an object representation,        -   a distribution,        -   or a dynamic representation.    -   A source representation of a software is understood as a        representation which after transformation, results in an object        representation. A source representation can offer different        levels, from a conceptual abstract level to a level executable        directly by a data processing system or a processing and        memorizing unit.    -   An object representation of a software corresponds to a level of        representation which after transfer to a distribution and upload        to a data processing system or a processing and memorizing unit,        can be executed. It can be, for instance, a binary code, an        interpreted code, etc.    -   A distribution is a physical or virtual support containing the        object representation, said distribution having to be put at the        user's disposal to enable them to use the software.    -   A dynamic representation corresponds to the execution of the        software from its distribution.    -   A portion of a software corresponds to some part of the software        and can, for instance correspond, to one or several consecutive        or not instructions, and/or one or several consecutive or not        functional blocks, and/or one or several functions, and/or one        or several subprograms, and/or one or several modules. A portion        of a software can also correspond to all of said software.

FIGS. 10 and 11 illustrate the various representations respectively of avulnerable software 2 v in the general sense, and of a protectedsoftware 2 p protected according to the process in accordance with theinvention.

FIG. 10 illustrates various representations of a vulnerable software 2 vappearing during its life cycle. The vulnerable software 2 v can thusappear under any of the following representations:

-   -   a source representation 2 vs,    -   an object representation 2 vo,    -   a distribution 2 vd. Said distribution can have commonly the        form of a physical distribution medium such as a CDROM or the        form of files distributed through a network (GSM, Internet,        etc.),    -   or a dynamic representation 2 ve corresponding to the execution        of the vulnerable software 2 v on a data processing system 3 of        any known type, which classically includes, at least one        processor 4.

FIG. 11 illustrates various representations of a protected software 2 pappearing during its life cycle. The protected software 2 p can thusappear under any of the following representations:

-   -   a source representation 2 ps including a first source part        intended for the data processing system 3 and a second source        part intended for the unit 6, part of said source parts can        commonly be contained in common files,    -   an object representation 2 po including a first object part 2        pos intended for the data processing system 3 and a second        object part 2 pou intended for the unit 6,    -   a distribution 2 pd including:        -   a first distribution part 2 pds containing the first object            part 2 pos, said first distribution part 2 pds being            intended for the data processing system 3 and which can            commonly have the form of a physical distribution medium            such as a CDROM or the form of files distributed through a            network (GSM, Internet, etc.),        -   and a second distribution part 2 pdu having the form:            -   of at least one pre-customized unit 66 to which a part                of the second object part 2 pou has been uploaded and                for which the user has to finish the customization by                uploading supplementary data so as to obtain a unit 6,                said supplementary data being obtained, for instance, by                download through a network,            -   or of at least one unit 6 to which the second object                part 2 pou has been uploaded,    -   or a dynamic representation 2 pe corresponding to the execution        of the protected software 2 p. Said dynamic representation 2 pe        includes a first execution part 2 pes which is executed in the        data processing system 3 and an second execution part 2 peu        which is executed in the unit 6.

In the case where the differentiation between the differentrepresentations of the protected software 2 p is not important, theexpressions first part of the protected software and second part of theprotected software shall be used.

The implementation of the process according to the invention inaccordance with the dynamic representation of FIG. 11, uses an apparatus1 p including a data processing system 3 linked up by a link 5 to a unit6. The data processing system 3 is of any type and includes,classically, at least one processor 4. The data processing system 3 canbe a computer or be part, for instance, of various machines, devices,fixed or mobile products, or vehicles in the general sense. The link 5can be realized in any possible way, such as for instance a serial link,a USB bus, a radio link, an optical link, a network link or a directelectric connection to a circuit of data processing system 3, etc. Itshould be observed that the unit 6 can possibly be physically locatedinside the same integrated circuit than the processor 4 of the dataprocessing system 3. In this case, the unit 6 can be considered as aco-processor in relation to the processor 4 of the data processingsystem 3 and the link 5 is internal to the integrated circuit.

FIGS. 20 to 22 show in an illustrative and non-limiting manner, variousembodiments of the apparatus 1 p allowing the implementation of theprotection process in accordance with the invention.

In the embodiment illustrated in FIG. 20, the protection apparatus 1 pincludes, as a data processing system 3, a computer and, as a unit 6, achip card 7 and its interface 8 commonly called card reader. Thecomputer 3 is linked up to the unit 6 by a link 5. During the executionof the protected software 2 p, the first execution part 2 pes which isexecuted in the computer 3 and the second execution part 2 peu which isexecuted in the chip card 7 and its interface 8, must both be functionalso that the protected software 2 p is completely functional.

In the embodiment illustrated in FIG. 21, the protection apparatus 1 pequips a product 9 in the general sense, including various components 10adapted to the function(s) assumed by such a product 9. The protectionapparatus 1 p includes, on the one hand, a data processing system 3embedded in the product 9 and, on the other hand, a unit 6 associatedwith the product 9. So that the product 9 is completely functional, theprotected software 2 p, must be completely functional. Thus, during theexecution of the protected software 2 p, the first execution part 2 peswhich is executed in the data processing system 3 and the secondexecution part 2 peu which is executed in the unit 6, must both befunctional. Said protected software 2 p enables therefore indirectly, toprotect against unauthorized usage, the product 9 or one of itsfunctionalities. For instance, the product 9 can be an installation, asystem, a machine, a toy, a piece of domestic appliances, a phone, etc.

In the embodiment illustrated in FIG. 22, the protection apparatus 1 pincludes several computers, as well as part of a communication network.The data processing system 3 is a first computer linked up by a link 5of network type, to a unit 6 constituted by a second computer. For theimplementation of the invention, the second computer 6 is used as alicense server for a protected software 2 p. During the execution of theprotected software 2 p, the first execution part 2 pes which is executedin the first computer 3 and the second execution part 2 peu which isexecuted in the second computer 6, must both be functional so that theprotected software 2 p is completely functional.

FIG. 30 enables to make explicit more precisely, the protection processin accordance with the invention. It should be observed that avulnerable software 2 v, is considered as being executed totally in adata processing system 3. On the other hand, in the case of theimplementation of a protected software 2 p, the data processing system 3includes transfer means 12 linked up by the link 5, to transfer means 13being part of the unit 6 enabling to establish communication between thefirst execution part 2 pes and the second execution part 2 peu of theprotected software 2 p.

It must be considered that the transfer means 12, 13 are of softwareand/or hardware nature and are capable of providing and, possibly,optimizing the data communication between the data processing system 3and the unit 6. Said transfer means 12, 13 are adapted to enable to haveat one's disposal a protected software 2 p which is, preferably,independent from the type of link 5 used. Said transfer means 12, 13 arenot part of the subject of the invention and are not described moreprecisely as they are well known by the Man of art. The first part ofthe protected software 2 p includes commands. During the execution ofthe protected software 2 p, the execution of said commands by the firstexecution part 2 pes enables the communication between the firstexecution part 2 pes and the second execution part 2 peu. In the rest ofthe description, said commands are represented by IN, OUT or TRIG.

As illustrated in FIG. 31, to allow the implementation of the secondexecution part 2 peu of the protected software 2 p, the unit 6 includesprotection means 14. The protection means 14 include memorization means15 and processing means 16.

For the sake of simplification in the rest of the description, it ischosen to consider, during the execution of the protected software 2 p,the presence of the unit 6 or the absence of the unit 6. In actual fact,a unit 6 providing protection means 14 not adapted to the execution ofthe second execution part 2 peu of the protected software 2 p is alsoconsidered as missing, each time the execution of the protected software2 p is not correct. In other words:

-   -   a unit 6 physically present and including protection means 14        adapted to the execution of the second execution part 2 peu of        the protected software 2 p, is always considered as present,    -   a unit 6 physically present but including protection means 14        not adapted, i.e. not allowing the correct implementation of the        second execution part 2 peu of the protected software 2 p is        considered as present, when it works correctly, and as missing        when it does not work correctly,    -   and a unit 6 physically missing is always considered as missing.

In the case where the unit 6 is constituted by a chip card 7 and itsinterface 8, the transfer means 13 are split into two parts, one beingon the interface 8 and the other one being on the chip card 7. In thisembodiment, the absence of the chip card 7 is considered as equivalentto the absence of the unit 6. In other words, in the absence of the chipcard 7 and/or its interface 8, the protection means 14 are notaccessible and do not enable the execution of the second execution part2 peu of the protected software 2 p, so much so that the protectedsoftware 2 p is not completely functional.

In accordance with the invention, the protection process aims atimplementing a principle of protection called by <<elementary function>>a description of which is carried out in relation to FIGS. 60 to 64.

For the implementation of the principle of protection by elementaryfunctions, are defined:

-   -   a set of elementary functions whose elementary functions are        liable to be executed, by means of the second execution part 2        peu, in the unit 6, and possibly to transfer data between the        data processing system 3 and the unit 6,    -   and a set of elementary commands for said set of elementary        functions, said elementary commands being liable to be executed        in the data processing system 3 and to trigger the execution in        the unit 6, of the corresponding elementary functions.

For the implementation of the principle of protection by elementaryfunctions, are also constructed exploitation means enabling to transforma blank unit 60 into a unit 6 able to execute elementary functions, theexecution of said elementary functions being triggered by the executionin the data processing system 3, of elementary commands.

For the implementation of the principle of protection by elementaryfunctions, is also chosen, in the source of the vulnerable software 2vs, at least one algorithmic processing using at least one operand andreturning at least one result. Is also chosen at least one portion ofthe source of the vulnerable software 2 vs containing at least onechosen algorithmic processing.

At least one chosen portion of the source of the vulnerable software 2vs is then modified, so as to obtain the source of the protectedsoftware 2 ps. This modification is such that, among others:

-   -   during the execution of the protected software 2 p, at least one        portion of the first execution part 2 pes, which is executed in        the data processing system 3, takes into account that the        functionality of at least one chosen algorithmic processing is        executed in the unit 6,    -   during the execution of the protected software 2 p, the second        execution part 2 peu, which is executed in the unit 6, executes        at least the functionality of at least one chosen algorithmic        processing,    -   each chosen algorithmic processing is split so that during the        execution of the protected software 2 p, each chosen algorithmic        processing is executed, by means of the second execution part 2        peu, using elementary functions. Preferably, each chosen        algorithmic processing is split into elementary functions fe_(n)        (with n varying from 1 to N), namely:        -   possibly one or several elementary functions enabling the            placing of one or several operands at the unit 6's disposal,        -   elementary functions, some of which use the operand(s) and            in combination, execute the functionality of the chosen            algorithmic processing, using said operand(s),        -   and possibly one or several elementary functions enabling            the placing of the result of the chosen algorithmic            processing at the data processing system 3's disposal by the            unit 6,    -   and a sequence of the elementary commands is chosen among the        set of sequences allowing the execution of the protected        software 2 p.

The first execution part 2 pes of the protected software 2 p, which isexecuted in the data processing system 3, executes elementary commandsCFE_(n) (with n varying from 1 to N), triggering in the unit 6, theexecution by means of the second execution part 2 peu, of each of thepreviously defined elementary functions fe_(n).

FIG. 60 illustrates an example of execution of a vulnerable software 2v. In this example, appears, during the execution of the vulnerablesoftware 2 v in the data processing system 3, at a certain time instant,the calculation of Z←F(X, Y) corresponding to the assignment to avariable Z of the result of an algorithmic processing represented by afunction F and using operands X and Y.

FIG. 61 illustrates an example of implementation of the invention forwhich the algorithmic processing chosen in FIG. 60 is remoted in theunit 6. In this example, during the execution in the data processingsystem 3 of the first execution part 2 pes of the protected software 2 pand in the presence of the unit 6, appear:

-   -   at time instants t₁, t₂, the execution of the elementary        commands CFE₁, CFE₂ triggering in the unit 6, the execution by        means of the second execution part 2 peu, of the corresponding        elementary functions fe₁, fe₂ which provide the transfer of data        X, Y from the data processing system 3 to memorization zones        respectively x, y located in the memorization means 15 of the        unit 6, said elementary commands CFE₁, CFE₂ being represented        respectively by OUT(x, X), OUT(y, Y),    -   at time instants t₃ to t_(N−1), the execution of the elementary        commands CFE₃ to CFE_(N−1), triggering in the unit 6, the        execution by means of the second execution part 2 peu, of the        corresponding elementary functions fe₃ to fe_(N−1), said        elementary commands CFE₃ to CFE_(N−1) being represented,        respectively, by TRIG(fe₃) to TRIG(fe_(N−1)). The series of        elementary functions fe₃ to fe_(N−1) executed in combination is        algorithmically equivalent to the function F. More precisely,        the execution of said elementary commands leads to the execution        in the unit 6, of the elementary functions fe₃ to fe_(N−1) which        use the contents of the memorization zones x, y and return the        result to a memorization zone z of the unit 6,    -   and at time instant t_(N), the execution of the elementary        command CFE_(N) triggering in the unit 6, the execution by means        of the second execution part 2 peu, of the elementary function        fe_(N) providing the transfer of the result of the algorithmic        processing, contained in the memorization zone z of the unit 6        to the data processing system 3, so as to assign it to the        variable Z, said elementary command CFE_(N) being represented by        IN(z).

In the illustrated example, the elementary commands 1 to N are executedsuccessively. It should be observed that two improvements can beeffected:

-   -   The first improvement concerns the case where several        algorithmic processings are remoted in the unit 6 and at least        the result of one algorithmic processing is used by another        algorithmic processing. In this case, some elementary commands        used for the transfer, can possibly be removed.    -   The second improvement aims at opting for a pertinent sequence        of the elementary commands among the set of sequences allowing        the execution of the protected software 2 p. In this respect, it        is preferable to choose a sequence of the elementary commands        which temporally dissociates the execution of the elementary        functions, by intercalating between them, portions of code        executed in the data processing system 3 and including or not        elementary commands used for the determination of other data.        FIGS. 62 and 63 illustrate the principle of such an embodiment.

FIG. 62 shows an example of execution of a vulnerable software 2 v. Inthis example, appears during the execution of the vulnerable software 2v, in the data processing system 3, the execution of two algorithmicprocessings leading to the determination of Z and Z′, such that Z←F (X,Y) and Z′←F′(X′, Y′).

FIG. 63 illustrates an example of implementation of the processaccording to the invention for which the two algorithmic processingchosen in FIG. 62 are remoted in the unit 6. According to such anexample, during the execution in the data processing system 3 of thefirst execution part 2 pes of the protected software 2 p and in thepresence of the unit 6, appear, as explained above, the execution of theelementary commands CFE₁ to CFE_(N) corresponding to the determinationof Z and the execution of the elementary commands CFE′₁ to CFE′_(M)corresponding to the determination of Z′. As illustrated, the elementarycommands CFE₁ to CFE_(N) are not executed consecutively, inasmuch as theelementary commands CFE′₁ to CFE′_(M), as well as other portions of codeare intercalated. In the example, the following sequence is thus carriedout: CFE₁, portion of intercalated code, CFE′₁, CFE₂, portion ofintercalated code, CFE′₂, CFE′₃, portion of intercalated code, CFE′₄,CFE₃, CFE₄, . . . , CFE_(N), CFE′_(M).

It should be observed that, during the execution of the protectedsoftware 2 p, in the presence of the unit 6, each time an elementarycommand contained in a portion of the first execution part 2 pes of theprotected software 2 p imposes it, the corresponding elementary functionis executed in the unit 6. Thus, it appears, that in the presence of theunit 6, said portion is executed correctly and that, consequently, theprotected software 2 p is completely functional.

FIG. 64 illustrates an example of an attempt of execution of theprotected software 2 p, when the unit 6 is missing. In this example,during the execution in the data processing system 3, of the firstexecution part 2 pes of the protected software 2 p, at every timeinstant, the execution of an elementary command cannot trigger theexecution of the corresponding elementary function, because of theabsence of the unit 6. The value to assign to the variable Z cannottherefore be determined correctly.

It therefore appears, that in the absence of the unit 6, at least onerequest by a portion of the first execution part 2 pes of the protectedsoftware 2 p, to trigger the execution of an elementary function in theunit 6 cannot be fulfilled correctly, so that at least said portion isnot executed correctly and that, consequently, the protected software 2p is not completely functional.

According to another advantageous characteristic of the invention, theprotection process aims at implementing a principle of protection calledby <<variable>> a description of which is carried out in relation toFIGS. 40 to 43.

For the implementation of the principle of protection by variable, ischosen in the source of the vulnerable software 2 vs at least onevariable which, during the execution of the vulnerable software 2 v,partially defines its state. By state of a software, must be understoodthe set of pieces of information, at a given moment, necessary to thecomplete execution of said software, so much so that the absence of sucha chosen variable prejudices the complete execution of said software. Isalso chosen at least one portion of the source of the vulnerablesoftware 2 vs containing at least one chosen variable.

At least one chosen portion of the source of the vulnerable software 2vs is then modified, so as to obtain the source of the protectedsoftware 2 ps. This modification is such that during the execution ofthe protected software 2 p, at least one portion of the first executionpart 2 pes which is executed in the data processing system 3, takes intoaccount that at least one chosen variable or at least one copy of chosenvariable resides in the unit 6.

FIG. 40 illustrates an example of execution of a vulnerable software 2v. In this example, during the execution of the vulnerable software 2 vin the data processing system 3, appear:

-   -   at time instant t₁, the assignment of the data X to the variable        V₁, represented by V₁←X,    -   at time instant t₂, the assignment of the value of the variable        V₁ to the variable Y, represented by Y←V₁,    -   and at time instant t₃, the assignment of the value of the        variable V₁ to the variable Z, represented by Z←V₁.

FIG. 41 illustrates an example of a first form of implementation of theinvention for which the variable resides in the unit 6. In this example,during the execution in the data processing system 3 of the firstexecution part 2 pes of the protected software 2 p, and in presence ofthe unit 6, appear:

-   -   at time instant t₁, the execution of a transfer command        triggering the transfer of the data X from the data processing        system 3 to the variable v₁ located in the memorization means 15        of the unit 6, said transfer command being represented by        OUT(v₁, X) and corresponding in the end to the assignment of the        data X to the variable v₁,    -   at time instant t₂, the execution of a transfer command        triggering the transfer of the value of the variable v₁ residing        in the unit 6 to the data processing system 3 so as to assign it        to the variable Y, said transfer command being represented by        IN(v₁) and corresponding in the end to the assignment of the        value of the variable v₁ to the variable Y,    -   and at time instant t₃, the execution of a transfer command        triggering the transfer of the value of the variable v₁ residing        in the unit 6 to the data processing system 3 so as to assign it        to the variable Z, said transfer command being represented by        IN(v₁) and corresponding in the end to the assignment of the        value of the variable v₁ to the variable Z.

It should be observed that during the execution of the protectedsoftware 2 p, at least one variable resides in the unit 6. Thus, when aportion of the first execution part 2 pes of the protected software 2 pimposes it, and in the presence of the unit 6, the value of saidvariable residing in the unit 6 is transferred to the data processingsystem 3 to be used by the first execution part 2 pes of the protectedsoftware 2 p, so much so that said portion is executed correctly andthat, consequently, the protected software 2 p is completely functional.

FIG. 42 illustrates an example of a second form of implementation of theinvention for which a copy of the variable resides in the unit 6. Inthis example, during the execution in the data processing system 3 ofthe first execution part 2 pes of the protected software 2 p, and in thepresence of the unit 6, appear:

-   -   at time instant t₁, the assignment of the data X to the variable        V₁ located in the data processing system 3, as well as the        execution of a transfer command triggering the transfer of the        data X from the data processing system 3 to the variable v₁        located in the memorization means 15 of the unit 6, said        transfer command being represented by OUT(v₁, X),    -   at time instant t₂, the assignment of the value of the variable        V₁ to the variable Y,    -   and at time instant t₃, the execution of a transfer command        triggering the transfer of the value of the variable v₁ residing        in the unit 6 to the data processing system 3 so as to affect it        to the variable Z, said transfer command being represented by        IN(v₁).

It should be observed that during the execution of the protectedsoftware 2 p, at least one copy of a variable resides in the unit 6.Thus, when a portion of the first execution part 2 pes of the protectedsoftware 2 p, imposes it, and in the presence of the unit 6, the valueof said copy of variable residing in the unit 6 is transferred to thedata processing system 3 to be used by the first execution part 2 pes ofthe protected software 2 p, so much so that said portion is executedcorrectly and that, consequently, the protected software 2 p iscompletely functional.

FIG. 43 illustrates an example of attempt of execution of the protectedsoftware 2 p, when the unit 6 is missing. In this example, during theexecution in the data processing system 3 of the first execution part 2pes of the protected software 2 p:

-   -   at time instant t₁, the execution of the transfer command        OUT(v₁, X) cannot trigger the transfer of the data X to the        variable v₁, taking into account the absence of the unit 6,    -   at time instant t₂, the execution of the transfer command IN(v₁)        cannot trigger the transfer of the value of the variable v₁ to        the data processing system 3, taking into account the absence of        the unit 6,    -   and at time instant t₃, the execution of the transfer command        IN(v₁) cannot trigger the transfer of the value of the variable        v₁ to the data processing system 3, taking into account the        absence of the unit 6.

It therefore appears that in the absence of the unit 6, at least onerequest by a portion of the first execution part 2 pes to use a variableor a copy of variable residing in the unit 6, cannot be fulfilledcorrectly, so that at least said portion is not executed correctly andthat, consequently, the protected software 2 p is not completelyfunctional.

It should be observed that the data transfers between the dataprocessing system 3 and the unit 6 illustrated in the previous examplesuse only simple assignments but that the Man of art will know how tocombine them with other operations to obtain complex operations such asfor instance OUT(v1, 2*X+3) or Z←(5*v1+v2).

According to another advantageous characteristic of the invention, theprotection process aims at implementing a principle of protection,called by <<detection and coercion>>, a description of which is carriedout in relation to FIGS. 70 to 74.

For the implementation of the principle of protection by detection andcoercion, are defined:

-   -   at least one software execution characteristic liable to be        monitored at least in part in the unit 6,    -   at least one criterion to abide by for at least one software        execution characteristic,    -   detection means 17 to implement in the unit 6 and enabling to        detect that at least one software execution characteristic does        not abide by at least one associated criterion,    -   and coercion means 18 to implement in the unit 6 and enabling to        inform the data processing system 3 and/or modify the execution        of a software, when at least one criterion is not abided by.

For the implementation of the principle of protection by detection andcoercion, are also constructed exploitation means enabling to transforma blank unit 60 into a unit 6 implementing at least the detection means17 and the coercion means 18.

FIG. 70 illustrates the means necessary to the implementation of thisprinciple of protection by detection and coercion. The unit 6 includesthe detection means 17 and the coercion means 18 belonging to theprocessing means 16. The coercion means 18 are informed by the detectionmeans 17 that a criterion has not been abided by.

More precisely, the detection means 17 use information coming from thetransfer means 13 and/or from the memorization means 15 and/or from theprocessing means 16, so as to monitor one or several software executioncharacteristics. For each software execution characteristic is set atleast one criterion to abide by.

In the case where it is detected that at least one software executioncharacteristic does not abide by at least one criterion, the detectionmeans 17 inform the coercion means 18 of it. Said coercion means 18 areadapted to modify, in the appropriate way, the state of the unit 6.

For the implementation of the principle of protection by detection andcoercion, are also chosen:

-   -   at least one software execution characteristic to monitor, among        the software execution characteristics liable to be monitored,    -   at least one criterion to abide by for at least one chosen        software execution characteristic,    -   in the source of the vulnerable software 2 vs, at least one        algorithmic processing for which at least one software execution        characteristic is to be monitored,    -   and in the source of the vulnerable software 2 vs, at least one        portion containing at least one chosen algorithmic processing.

At least one chosen portion of the source of the vulnerable software 2vs is then modified, so as to obtain the source of the protectedsoftware 2 ps. This modification is such that, during the execution ofthe protected software 2 p, among others:

-   -   at least one portion of the first execution part 2 pes, which is        executed in the data processing system 3, takes into account        that at least one chosen software execution characteristic is to        be monitored, at least in part in the unit 6,    -   and the second execution part 2 peu, which is executed in the        unit 6, monitors at least in part, a chosen software execution        characteristic.

During the execution of the protected software 2 p, protected by thisprinciple of protection by detection and coercion, in the presence ofthe unit 6:

-   -   as long as all the criteria corresponding to all the monitored        execution characteristics of all the modified portions of the        protected software 2 p are abided by, said modified portions of        the protected software 2 p work nominally, so that said        protected software 2 p works nominally,    -   and if at least one of the criteria corresponding to a monitored        execution characteristic of a portion of the protected software        2 p is not abided by, the data processing system 3 is informed        of it and/or the functioning of the portion of the protected        software 2 p is modified, so that the functioning of the        protected software 2 p is modified.

Naturally, in the absence of the unit 6, at least one request by aportion of the first execution part 2 pes of the protected software 2 pto use the unit 6 cannot be fulfilled correctly so that at least saidportion is not executed correctly and that consequently the protectedsoftware 2 p is not completely functional.

For the implementation of the principle of protection by detection andcoercion, two types of software execution characteristics are usedpreferentially.

The first type of software execution characteristic corresponds to avariable of measurement of the execution of a software and the secondtype corresponds to a profile of usage of a software. Said two types ofcharacteristics can be used independently or in combination.

For the implementation of the principle of protection by detection andcoercion using, as execution characteristic, a variable of measurementof software execution, are defined:

-   -   in the memorization means 15, the possibility to memorize at        least one variable of measurement used to quantify the usage of        at least one functionality of a software,    -   in the detection means 17, the possibility to monitor at least        one threshold associated to each variable of measurement,    -   and actualization means enabling to update each variable of        measurement depending on the usage of the functionality to which        it is associated.

Are also constructed exploitation means implementing, in addition to thedetection means 17 and the coercion means 18, the actualization means.

Are also chosen, in the source of the vulnerable software 2 vs:

-   -   at least one functionality of the vulnerable software 2 v whose        usage is liable to be monitored using a variable of measurement,    -   at least one variable of measurement used to quantify the usage        of said functionality,    -   at least one threshold associated to the variable of measurement        corresponding to a limit of usage of said functionality,    -   and at least one method of update of the variable of measurement        depending on the usage of said functionality.

The source of the vulnerable software 2 vs is then modified, so as toobtain the source of the protected software 2 ps, this modificationbeing such that, during the execution of the protected software 2 p, thesecond execution 2 peu:

-   -   actualizes the variable of measurement depending on the usage of        said functionality,    -   and takes into account at least one threshold crossing.

In other words, during the execution of the protected software 2 p, thevariable of measurement is updated depending on the usage of saidfunctionality, and when the threshold is crossed, the detection means 17inform of it the coercion means 18 which make an adapted decision toinform the data processing system 3 and/or to modify the processingscarried out by the processing means 16 enabling to modify thefunctioning of the portion of the protected software 2 p, so that thefunctioning of the protected software 2 p is modified.

For the implementation of a first preferred variant embodiment of theprinciple of protection by detection and coercion using, ascharacteristic, a variable of measurement, are defined:

-   -   for at least one variable of measurement, several associated        thresholds,    -   and different coercion means corresponding to each of said        thresholds.

Are also chosen, in the source of the vulnerable software 2 vs:

-   -   at least one variable of measurement used to quantify the usage        of at least one functionality of the software and to which must        be associated several thresholds corresponding to different        limits of usage of said functionalities,    -   and at least two thresholds associated to the variable of        measurement.

The source of the vulnerable software 2 vs is then modified, so as toobtain the source of the protected software 2 ps, this modificationbeing such that, during the execution of the protected software 2 p, thesecond execution part 2 peu:

-   -   actualizes the variable of measurement depending on the usage of        said functionality,    -   and takes into account, differently, the crossing of the various        thresholds.

In other words, classically, during the execution of the protectedsoftware 2 p, when the first threshold is crossed, the unit 6 informsthe data processing system 3 enjoining the protected software 2 p not touse said functionality anymore. If the protected software 2 p carries onusing said functionality, the second threshold will potentially becrossed. In the case where the second threshold is crossed, the coercionmeans 18 can make the chosen functionality ineffective and/or make theprotected software 2 p ineffective.

For the implementation of a second preferred variant embodiment of theprinciple of protection by detection and coercion using, ascharacteristic, a variable of measurement, are defined refilling meansenabling to credit at least one software functionality monitored by avariable of measurement with at least one additional usage.

Are also constructed exploitation means implementing, in addition to thedetection means 17, the coercion means 18 and the actualization means,the refilling means.

Is also chosen, in the source of the vulnerable software 2 vs, at leastone variable of measurement used to limit the usage of at least onefunctionality of the software and which must be able to be credited withat least one additional usage.

The source of the vulnerable software 2 vs is then modified, so as toobtain the source of the protected software 2 ps, this modificationbeing such that, during a phase called of refilling, at least oneadditional usage of at least one functionality corresponding to a chosenvariable of measurement can be credited.

Is carried out, during the phase of refilling, the reactualization of atleast one chosen variable of measurement and/or of at least oneassociated threshold, so as to allow at least one additional usage ofthe corresponding functionality. In other words, it is possible, duringthe phase of refilling, to credit additional usages of at least onefunctionality of the protected software 2 p.

For the implementation of the principle of protection by detection andcoercion using, as characteristic, a profile of software usage, isdefined as criterion to abide by for said profile of usage, at least onefeature of software execution.

Are also chosen, in the source of the vulnerable software 2 vs:

-   -   at least one profile of usage to monitor,    -   and at least one feature of execution by which at least one        chosen profile of usage must abide.

The source of the vulnerable software 2 vs is then modified, so as toobtain the source of the protected software 2 ps, this modificationbeing such that, during the execution of the protected software 2 p, thesecond execution part 2 peu abides by all the chosen features ofexecution. In other words, the unit 6 itself monitors the way the secondexecution part 2 peu is executed and can inform the data processingsystem 3 and/or modify the functioning of the protected software 2 p, inthe case where at least one feature of execution is not abided by.

During the execution of the protected software 2 p, protected by thisprinciple, in the presence of the unit 6:

-   -   as long as all the features of execution of all the modified        portions of the protected software 2 p are abided by, said        modified portions of the protected software 2 p work nominally,        so that said protected software 2 p works nominally,    -   and if at least one feature of execution of a portion of        protected software 2 p is not abided by, the data processing        system 3 is informed of it and/or the functioning of the portion        of the protected software 2 p is modified, so that the        functioning of the protected software 2 p is modified.

The monitoring of different features of execution can be considered,like for instance the monitoring of the presence of instructionsincluding a marker or the monitoring of the execution chaining for atleast one part of the instructions.

For the implementation of the principle of protection by detection andcoercion using as feature of execution to abide by, the monitoring ofthe execution chaining for at least one part of the instructions, aredefined:

-   -   an instructions set, whose instructions are liable to be        executed in the unit 6,    -   a set of instructions commands for said instructions set, said        instructions commands are liable to be executed in the data        processing system 3. The execution of each of said instructions        commands in the data processing system 3 triggers in the unit 6,        the execution of the corresponding instruction,    -   detection means 17 enabling to detect that the chaining of the        instructions does not correspond to the expected one,    -   and coercion means 18 enabling to inform the data processing        system 3 and/or to modify the execution of a software when the        chaining of the instructions does not correspond to the expected        one.

Are also constructed exploitation means enabling the unit 6 to alsoexecute the instructions of the instructions set, the execution of saidinstructions being triggered by the execution in the data processingsystem 3 of the instructions commands.

Is also chosen, in the source of the vulnerable software 2 vs, at leastone algorithmic processing which must be remoted in the unit 6 and forwhich the chaining of at least one part of the instructions is to bemonitored.

The source of the vulnerable software 2 vs is then modified, so as toobtain the source of the vulnerable software 2 ps, this modificationbeing such that, during the execution of the protected software 2 p:

-   -   the second execution part 2 peu executes at least the        functionality of the chosen algorithmic processing,    -   the chosen algorithmic processing is split into instructions,    -   the chaining by which at least some of the instructions must        abide during their execution in the unit 6 is specified,    -   and the first execution part 2 pes of the protected software 2 p        executes instructions commands which trigger the execution of        the instructions in the unit 6.

During the execution of the protected software 2 p, protected by thisprinciple, in the presence of the unit 6:

-   -   as long as the chaining of the instructions of all the modified        portions of the protected software 2 p, executed in the unit 6        corresponds to the expected one, said modified portions of the        protected software 2 p work nominally, so that said protected        software 2 p works nominally,    -   and if the chaining of the instructions of a portion of the        protected software 2 p executed in the unit 6 does not        correspond to the expected one, the data processing system 3 is        informed of it and/or the functioning of the portion of        protected software 2 p is modified, so that the functioning of        the protected software 2 p is modified.

FIG. 71 illustrates an example of implementation of the principle ofprotection by detection and coercion using, as feature of execution toabide by the monitoring of the execution chaining of a at least one partof the instructions, in the case where the expected chaining is abidedby.

The first execution part 2 pes of the protected software 2 p, executedin the data processing system 3, executes instructions commands CI_(i)triggering, in the unit 6 the execution of the instructions i_(i)belonging to the instructions set. In said instructions set, at leastsome of the instructions each include a part defining the functionalityof the instruction and a part enabling to verify the expected chainingfor the execution of the instructions. In this example, the instructionscommands CI_(i) are represented by TRIG(i_(i)) and the expected chainingfor the execution of the instructions is i_(n), i_(n+1) and i_(n+2). Theexecution in the unit 6, of the instruction i_(n) gives the result a andthe execution of the instruction i_(n+1) gives the result b. Theinstruction i_(n+2) uses as operand, the results a and b of theinstructions i_(n) and i_(n+1) and its execution gives the result c.

Taking into account that said chaining of the instructions executed inthe unit 6 corresponds to the expected one, it results in a normal ornominal functioning of the protected software 2 p.

FIG. 72 illustrates an example of implementation of the principle ofprotection by detection and coercion using, as feature of execution toabide by, the monitoring of the execution chaining of at least one partof the instructions, in the case where the expected chaining is notabided by.

According to this example, the expected chaining for the execution ofthe instructions is still i_(n), i_(n+1) and i_(n+2). However, theexecution chaining is modified by the replacement of the instructioni_(n) with the instruction i′_(n), so that the chaining actuallyexecuted is i′_(n), i_(n+1) and i_(n+2). The execution of theinstruction i′_(n) gives the result a, i.e. the same result that theexecution of the instruction i_(n). However, at the latest during theexecution of the instruction i_(n+2), the detection means 17 detect thatthe instruction i′_(n) does not correspond to the expected instructionto generate the result a used as operand of the instruction i_(n+2). Thedetection means 17 inform of it the coercion means 18 which modifyaccordingly, the functioning of the instruction i_(n+2), so that theexecution of the instruction i_(n+2) gives the result c′ which can bedifferent than c. Naturally, if the execution of the instruction i′_(n)gives a result a′ different from the result a of the instruction i_(n),it is clear that the result of the instruction i_(n+2) can also bedifferent from c.

Inasmuch as the execution chaining of the instructions executed in theunit 6 does not correspond to the expected one, a modification of thefunctioning of the protected software 2 p can therefore be obtained.

FIGS. 73 and 74 illustrates a preferred variant embodiment of theprinciple of protection by detection and coercion using, as feature ofexecution to abide by, the monitoring of the execution chaining of atleast one part of the instructions. According to this preferred variant,is defined an instructions set whose at least some instructions workwith registers and use at least one operand with the intention ofreturning a result.

As illustrated in FIG. 73, are defined for at least some of theinstructions working with registers, a part PF defining thefunctionality of the instruction and a part PE defining the expectedchaining for the execution of the instructions. The part PF correspondsto the operation code known by the Man of art. The part PE defining theexpected chaining, includes bits fields corresponding to:

-   -   an identification field of the instruction CII,    -   and for each operand k of the instruction, with k varying from 1        to K, and K number of operands of the instruction:        -   a flag field CD_(k), indicating whether or not it is            appropriate to verify the origin of the operand k,        -   and an expected identification field CIP_(k) of the operand,            indicating the expected identity of the instruction which            has generated the contents of the operand k.

As illustrated in FIG. 74, the instructions set includes V registersbelonging to the processing means 16, each register being named R_(v),with v varying from 1 to V. For each register R_(v), are defined twofields, namely:

-   -   a functional field CF_(v), known by the Man of art and enabling        to store the result of the execution of the instructions,    -   and a generated identification field CIG_(v) enabling to        memorize the identity of the instruction which has generated the        contents of the functional field CF_(v). Said generated        identification field CIG_(v) is automatically updated with the        contents of the identification field of the instruction CII        which has generated the functional field CF_(v). Said generated        identification field CIG_(v) is neither accessible, nor        modifiable by any of the instructions and is solely used for the        detection means 17.

During the execution of an instruction, the detection means 17 carry outfor each operand k the following operations:

-   -   the flag field CD_(k) is read,    -   if the flag field CD_(k) imposes it, the expected identification        field CIP_(k) and the generated identification field CIG_(v)        corresponding to the register used by the operand k are both        read,    -   the equality of the two fields CIP_(k) and CIG_(v) is checked,    -   and if the equality is false, the detection means 17 consider        that the execution chaining of the instructions is not abided        by.

The coercion means 18 enable to modify the result of the instructionswhen the detection means 17 has informed them of an instructionschaining not abided by. A preferred embodiment is carried out bymodifying the functional part PF of the instruction currently executedor the functional part PF of subsequent instructions.

According to another advantageous characteristic of the invention, theprotection process aims at implementing a principle of protection,called by <<renaming>> a description of which is carried out in relationto FIGS. 80 to 85.

For the implementation of the principle of protection by renaming, aredefined:

-   -   a set of dependent functions, whose dependent functions are        liable to be executed, by means of the second execution part 2        peu, in the unit 6, and possibly to transfer data between the        data processing system 3 and the unit 6, said set of dependent        functions can be finite or infinite,    -   a set of triggering commands for said dependent functions, said        triggering commands being liable to be executed in the data        processing system 3 and to trigger in the unit 6, the execution        of corresponding dependent functions,    -   for each triggering command, an order corresponding at least in        part to the information transmitted by the first execution part        2 pes, to the second execution part 2 peu, so as to trigger the        execution of the corresponding dependent function, said order        having the form of at least one argument of the triggering        command,    -   a method of renaming of the orders designed to be used during        the modification of the vulnerable software 2 v, such a method        enabling to rename the orders so as to obtain triggering        commands with renamed orders enabling to conceal the identity of        the corresponding dependent functions,    -   and restoring means 20 designed to be used in the unit 6 during        the usage phase and enabling to restore the initial order, from        the renamed order, so as to restore the dependent function to        execute.

For the implementation of the principle of protection by renaming, arealso constructed exploitation means enabling to transform a blank unit60 into a unit 6 implementing at least the restoring means 20.

For the implementation of the principle of protection by renaming, arealso chosen, in the source of the vulnerable software 2 vs:

-   -   at least one algorithmic processing using at least one operand        and returning at least one result,    -   and at least one portion of the source of the vulnerable        software 2 vs, containing at least one chosen algorithmic        processing.

The source of the vulnerable software 2 vs is then modified, so as toobtain the source of the protected software 2 ps. This modification issuch that, among others:

-   -   during the execution of the protected software 2 p, at least one        portion of the first execution part 2 pes, which is executed in        the data processing system 3, takes into account that the        functionality of at least one chosen algorithmic processing is        executed in the unit 6,    -   during the execution of the protected software 2 p, the second        execution part 2 peu, which is executed in the unit 6, executes        at least the functionality of at least one chosen algorithmic        processing,    -   each chosen algorithmic processing is split so that during the        execution of the protected software 2 p, each chosen algorithmic        processing is executed, by means of the second execution part 2        peu, using dependent functions. Preferably, each chosen        algorithmic processing is split into dependent functions fd_(n)        (with n varying from 1 to N), namely:        -   possibly one or several dependent functions enabling the            placing of one or several operands at the unit 6's disposal,        -   dependent functions, some of which use the operand(s) and            execute in combination the functionality of the chosen            algorithmic processing, using said operand(s),        -   and possibly, one or several dependent functions enabling            the placing by the unit 6, at the data processing system 3's            disposal of the result of the chosen algorithmic processing,    -   during the execution of the protected software 2 p, the second        execution part 2 peu executes the dependent functions fd_(n),    -   during the execution of the protected software 2 p, the        dependent functions are triggered by triggering commands with        renamed orders,    -   and a sequence of the triggering commands is chosen among the        set of sequences allowing the execution of the protected        software 2 p.

The first execution part 2 pes of the protected software 2 p, executedin the data processing system 3, executes triggering commands withrenamed orders transferring renamed orders to the unit 6, and triggeringin the unit 6 the restoring by means of the restoring means 20, of theorders, and then the execution by means of the second execution part 2peu, of each of the previously defined dependent functions fd_(n).

In other words, the principle of protection by renaming is carried outby renaming the orders of the triggering commands, so as to obtaintriggering commands with renamed orders whose execution in the dataprocessing system 3, triggers in the unit 6, the execution of thedependent functions which would have been triggered by the triggeringcommands with not-renamed orders, without however the examination of theprotected software 2 p enabling to determine the identity of theexecuted dependent functions.

FIG. 80 illustrates an example of execution of a vulnerable software 2v. In this example, appears during the execution of the vulnerablesoftware 2 v in the data processing system 3, at a certain time instant,the calculation of Z←F(X, Y) corresponding to the assignment to avariable Z of the result of an algorithmic processing represented by afunction F and using the operands X and Y.

FIGS. 81 and 82 illustrate an example of implementation of theinvention.

FIG. 81 illustrates the partial implementation of the invention. In thisexample, during the execution in the data processing system 3 of thefirst execution part 2 pes of the protected software 2 p and in thepresence of the unit 6, appear:

-   -   at time instants t₁, t₂, the execution of the triggering        commands CD₁, CD₂ triggering in the unit 6, the execution by        means of the second execution part 2 peu, of the corresponding        dependent functions fd₁, fd₂ which provide the transfer of data        X, Y from the data processing system 3 to the memorization zones        respectively x, y located in the memorization means 15 of the        unit 6, said triggering commands CD₁, CD₂ being represented        respectively by OUT(x, X), OUT(y, Y),    -   at time instants t₃ to t_(N−1), the execution of the triggering        commands CD₃ to CD_(N−1), triggering in the unit 6, the        execution by means of the second execution part 2 peu, of the        corresponding dependent functions fd₃ to fd_(N−1), said        triggering commands CD₃ to CD_(N−1) being represented        respectively, by TRIG(fd₃) to TRIG(fd_(N−1)). The series of        dependent functions fd₃ to fd_(N−1) executed in combination is        algorithmically equivalent to the function F. More precisely,        the execution of said triggering commands leads to the execution        in the unit 6, of the dependent functions fd₃ to fd_(N−1) which        use the contents of the memorization zones x, y and return the        result in a memorization zone z of the unit 6,    -   and at time instant t_(N), the execution of a triggering command        CD_(N) triggering in the unit 6, the execution by means of the        second execution part 2 peu, of the dependent function fd_(N)        providing the transfer of the result of the algorithmic        processing contained in the memorization zone z of the unit 6 to        the data processing system 3, so as to assign it to the variable        Z, said command being represented by IN(z).

In this example, to completely implement the invention, are chosen asorders, the first argument of the triggering commands OUT and theargument of the triggering commands TRIG and IN. The orders chosen inthis way are renamed using the method of renaming of the orders. In thismanner, the orders of the triggering commands CD₁ to CD_(N) i.e. x, y,fd₃, fd_(N−1), z are renamed so as to obtain respectively R(x), R(y),R(fd₃) . . . , R(fd_(N−1)), R(z).

FIG. 82 illustrates the complete implementation of the invention. Inthis example, during the execution in the data processing system 3, ofthe first execution part 2 pes of the protected software 2 p, and in thepresence of the unit 6, appear:

-   -   at time instants t₁, t₂, the execution of the triggering        commands with renamed orders CDCR₁, CDCR₂, transferring to the        unit 6, the renamed orders R(x), R(y) as well as the data X, Y        triggering in the unit 6 the restoring by means of the restoring        means 20, of the renamed orders to restore the orders i.e. the        identity of the memorization zones x, y, and then the execution        by means of the second execution part 2 peu, of the        corresponding dependent functions fd₁, fd₂ which provide the        transfer of the data X, Y from the data processing system 3 to        the memorization zones respectively x, y located in the        memorization means 15 of the unit 6, said triggering commands        with renamed orders CDCR₁, CDCR₂ being represented respectively        by OUT (R(x), X), OUT (R(y), Y),    -   at time instants t₃ to t_(N−1), the execution of the triggering        commands with renamed orders CDCR₃ to CDCR_(N−1), transferring        to the unit 6, the renamed orders R(fd₃) to R(fd_(N−1)),        triggering in the unit 6 the restoring by means of the restoring        means 20, of the orders, i.e. fd₃ to fd_(N−1), and then the        execution by means of the second execution part 2 peu, of the        dependent functions fd₃ to fd_(N−1), said triggering commands        with renamed orders CDCR₃ to CDCR_(N−1) being represented        respectively by TRIG (R(fd₃)) to TRIG (R(fd_(N−1))),    -   and at time instant t_(N), the execution of the triggering        command with renamed order CDCR_(N) transferring to the unit 6,        the renamed order R(z) triggering in the unit 6 the restoring by        means of restoring means 20, of the order i.e. the identity of        the memorization zone z, and then the execution by means of the        second execution part 2 peu, of the dependent function fd_(N)        providing the transfer of the result of the algorithmic        processing contained in the memorization zone z of the unit 6 to        the data processing system 3, so as to assign it to the variable        Z, said triggering command with renamed order CDCR_(N) being        represented by IN (R(z)).

In the illustrated example, the triggering commands with renamed orders1 to N are executed successively. It should be observed that twoimprovements can be effected:

-   -   The first improvement concerns the case where several        algorithmic processings are remoted to the unit 6 and at least        the result of one algorithmic processing is used by another        algorithmic processing. In this case, some triggering commands        with renamed orders used for the transfer, can possibly be        removed.    -   The second improvement aims at opting for a pertinent sequence        of the triggering commands with renamed orders among the set of        sequences allowing the execution of the protected software 2 p.        In this respect, it is preferable to choose a sequence of the        triggering commands with renamed orders which dissociate        temporally the execution of the dependent functions, by        intercalating, between them portions of code executed in the        data processing system 3 and including or not triggering        commands with renamed orders used of the determination of other        data. FIGS. 83 and 84 illustrate the principle of such an        embodiment.

FIG. 83 shows an example of execution of a vulnerable software 2 v. Inthis example, appears, during the execution of the vulnerable software 2v, in the data processing system 3, the execution of two algorithmicprocessings leading to the determination of Z and Z′, such as Z←F(X, Y)and Z′←F′(X′, Y′).

FIG. 84 illustrates an example of implementation of the processaccording to the invention for which the two algorithmic proccesingschosen in FIG. 83 are remoted to the unit 6. According to such anexample, during the execution in the data processing system 3 of thefirst execution part 2 pes of the protected software 2 p and in thepresence of the unit 6, appear, as explained above, the execution of thetriggering commands with renamed orders CDCR₁ to CDCR_(N) correspondingto the determination of Z and the execution of the triggering commandswith renamed orders CDCR′₁, to CDCR′_(M) corresponding to thedetermination of Z′. As illustrated, the triggering commands withrenamed orders CDCR₁ to CDCR_(N) are not executed consecutively,inasmuch as the triggering commands with renamed orders CDCR′₁ toCDCR′_(M) as well as other portions of code are intercalated. In theexample, the following sequence is thus carried out: CDCR₁, portion ofintercalated code, CDCR′₁, CDCR₂, portion of intercalated code, CDCR′₂,CDCR′₃, portion of intercalated code, CDCR′₄, CDCR₃, CDCR₄, . . . ,CDCR_(N), CDCR′_(M).

It should be observed that, during the execution of a portion of thefirst execution part 2 pes of the protected software 2 p, the triggeringcommands with renamed orders executed in the data processing system 3,trigger in the unit 6 the restoring of the identity of the correspondingdependent functions and then their execution. Thus, it appears that inthe presence of the unit 6, said portion is executed correctly and that,consequently, the protected software 2 p is completely functional.

FIG. 85 illustrates an example of an attempt of execution of theprotected software 2 p, when the unit 6 is missing. In this example,during the execution in the data processing system 3 of the firstexecution part 2 pes of the protected software 2 p, at every timeinstant, the execution of a triggering command with renamed order cantrigger neither the restoring of the order nor the execution of thecorresponding dependent function, because of the absence of the unit 6.The value to assign to the variable Z cannot therefore be determinedcorrectly.

It therefore appears, that in the absence of the unit 6, at least onerequest by a portion of the first execution part 2 pes of the protectedsoftware 2 p, to trigger the restoring of an order and the execution ofa dependent function in the unit 6 cannot be fulfilled correctly, sothat at least said portion is not executed correctly and that,consequently, the protected software 2 p is not completely functional.

Thanks to this principle of protection by renaming, the examination inthe protected software 2 p of the triggering commands with renamedorders does not enable to determine the identity of the dependentfunctions which have to be executed in the unit 6. It should be observedthat the renaming of the orders is carried out during the modificationof the vulnerable 2 v to a protected software 2 p.

According to a variant of the principle of protection by renaming, isdefined for at least one dependent function, a family of dependentfunctions algorithmically equivalent but triggered by differenttriggering commands with renamed orders. According to this variant, forat least one algorithmic processing using dependent functions, saidalgorithmic processing is split into dependent functions which for atleast one of them is replaced with a dependent function of the samefamily instead of keeping several occurrences of the same dependentfunction. To this end, triggering commands with renamed orders aremodified to take into account the replacement of dependent functionswith dependent functions of the same family. In other words, twodependent functions of the same family have different orders andconsequently different triggering commands with renamed orders and, itis not possible, by examining the protected software 2 p, to discoverthat the dependent functions called are algorithmically equivalent.

According to a first preferred embodiment of the variant of theprinciple of protection by renaming, is defined for at least onedependent function, a family of algorithmically equivalent dependentfunctions, by concatenating a noise field to the information definingthe functional part of the dependent function to execute in the unit 6.

According to a second preferred embodiment of the variant of theprinciple of protection by renaming, is defined for at least onedependent function, a family of algorithmically equivalent dependentfunctions by using identification fields.

According to a preferred variant embodiment of the principle ofprotection by renaming, is defined as method of renaming of the orders aciphering method enabling to cipher the orders to transform them intorenamed orders. Remember that the renaming of the orders is carried outduring the phase of protection P. For this preferred variant, therestoring means 20 are means implementing a deciphering method enablingto decipher the renamed orders and thus to restore the identity of thedependent functions to execute in the unit 6. Said restoring means areimplemented in the unit 6 and can be of software or hardware nature.Said restoring means 20 are appealed to during the usage phase U eachtime a triggering command with renamed order is executed in the dataprocessing system 3 with the intention of triggering in the unit 6, theexecution of a dependent function.

According to another advantageous characteristic of the invention, theprotection process aims at implementing a principle of protection calledby <<conditional branch>> a description of which is carried out inrelation to FIGS. 90 to 92.

For the implementation of the principle of protection by conditionalbranch, is chosen in the source of the vulnerable software 2 vs, atleast one conditional branch BC. Is also chosen at least one portion ofthe source of the vulnerable software 2 vs containing at least onechosen conditional branch BC.

At least one chosen portion of the source of the vulnerable software 2vs is then modified, so as to obtain the source of the protectedsoftware 2 ps. This modification is such that, during the execution ofthe protected software 2 p, among others:

-   -   at least one portion of the first execution part 2 pes, which is        executed in the data processing system 3, takes into account        that the functionality of at least one chosen conditional branch        BC is executed in the unit 6,    -   and the second execution part 2 peu, which is executed in the        unit 6, executes at least the functionality of at least one        chosen conditional branch BC and puts at the data processing        system 3's disposal, a piece of information enabling the first        execution part 2 pes, to carry on its execution at the chosen        spot.

The first execution part 2 pes of the protected software 2 p, executedin the data processing system 3, executes conditional branches commands,triggering in the unit 6, the execution by means of the second executionpart 2 peu, of remoted conditional branches bc whose functionality isequivalent to the functionality of the chosen conditional branches BC.

FIG. 90 illustrates an example of execution of a vulnerable software 2v. In this example, appears, during the execution of the vulnerablesoftware 2 v in the data processing system 3 at a certain time instant,a conditional branch BC indicating to the vulnerable software 2 v thespot where to carry on its execution, i.e. one of the three possiblespots B₁, B₂ or B₃. It must be understood that the conditional branch BCtakes the decision to carry on the execution of the software at spot B₁,B₂ or B₃.

FIG. 91 illustrates an example of implementation of the invention forwhich the conditional branch chosen to be remoted to the unit 6,corresponds to the conditional branch BC. In this example, during theexecution in the data processing system 3 of the first execution part 2pes of the protected software 2 p and in the presence of the unit 6,appear:

-   -   at time instant t₁, the execution of the conditional branch        command CBC₁ triggering in the unit 6, the execution by means of        the second execution part 2 peu, of the remoted conditional        branch be algorithmically equivalent to the conditional branch        BC, said conditional branch command CBC₁ being represented by        TRIG(bc),    -   and at time instant t₂, the transfer from the unit 6 to the data        processing system 3, of the information enabling the first        execution part 2 pes, to carry on its execution at the chosen        spot, i.e. the spot B₁, B₂ or B₃.

It should be observed that during the execution of a portion of thefirst execution part 2 pes of the protected software 2 p, theconditional branches commands executed in the data processing system 3trigger the execution of the corresponding remoted conditional branchesin the unit 6. Thus, it appears, that in the presence of the unit 6,said portion is executed correctly and that, consequently, the protectedsoftware 2 p is completely functional.

FIG. 92 illustrates an example of an attempt of execution of theprotected software 2 p, when the unit 6 is missing. In this example,during the execution in the data processing system 3 of the firstexecution part 2 pes of the protected software 2 p:

-   -   at time instant t₁, the execution of the conditional branch        command CBC₁, cannot trigger the execution of the remoted        conditional branch bc, taking into account the absence of the        unit 6,    -   and at time instant t₂, the transfer of the piece of information        enabling the first execution part 2 pes to carry on at the        chosen spot fails taking into account the absence of the unit 6.

It therefore appears that in the absence of the unit 6, at least onerequest by a portion of the first execution part 2 pes to trigger theexecution of a remoted conditional branch in the unit 6, cannot befulfilled correctly, so that at least said portion is not executedcorrectly and that, consequently, the protected software 2 p is notcompletely functional.

In the previous description in relation to FIGS. 90 to 92, the subjectof the invention aims at remoting in the unit 6, a conditional branch.Naturally, a preferred embodiment of the invention can be carried out byremoting in the unit 6, a series of conditional branches whose overallfunctionality is equivalent to all the functionalities of theconditional branches which have been remoted. The execution of theoverall functionality of said series of remoted conditional branchesleads to the placing at the data processing system 3's disposal of apiece of information enabling the first execution part 2 pes of theprotected software 2 p to carry on its execution at the chosen spot.

In the previous description in relation to FIGS. 40 to 92, fivedifferent principles of software protection have been made explicitgenerally speaking independently of one another. The protection processin accordance with the invention, is implemented by using the principleof protection by elementary functions, possibly combined with one orseveral other principles of protection. In the case where the principleof protection by elementary functions is complemented by theimplementation of at least another principle of protection, theprinciple of protection by elementary functions is advantageouslycomplemented by the principle of protection by variable and/or theprinciple of protection by detection and coercion and/or the principleof protection by renaming and/or the principle of protection byconditional branch.

And when the principle of protection by detection and coercion is alsoimplemented, it can be complemented in its turn by the principle ofprotection by renaming and/or the principle of protection by conditionalbranch.

And when the principle of protection by renaming is also implemented, itcan be complemented in its turn by the principle of protection byconditional branch.

According to the preferred variant embodiment, the principle ofprotection by elementary functions is complemented by the principle ofprotection by variable, complemented by the principle of protection bydetection and coercion, complemented by the principle of protection byrenaming, complemented by the principle of protection by conditionalbranch.

In the case where a principle of protection is applied, in complement tothe principle of protection by elementary functions, its previouslycarried out description must include, to take into account its combinedimplementation, the following modifications:

-   -   the notion of vulnerable software must be understood as software        vulnerable towards the principle of protection being described.        Thus, in the case where a principle of protection has already        been applied to the vulnerable software, the expression        “vulnerable software” must be interpreted by the reader as the        expression “software protected by the principle(s) of protection        already applied”;    -   the notion of protected software must be understood as software        protected towards the principle of protection being described.        Thus, in the case where a principle of protection has already        been applied, the expression “protected software” must be        interpreted by the reader as the expression “new version of the        protected software”;    -   and the choice(s) made for the implementation of the principle        of protection being described must take into account the        choice(s) made for the implementation of the principle(s) of        protection already applied.

The rest of the description enables to have a better understanding ofthe implementation of the protection process in accordance with theinvention. This protection process according to the invention iscomposed, as shown more precisely in FIG. 100:

-   -   first, of a protection phase P during which a vulnerable        software 2 v is modified to become a protected software 2 p,    -   then, of a usage phase U during which the protected software 2 p        is used. During this usage phase U:        -   in the presence of the unit 6 and each time a portion of the            first execution part 2 pes executed in the data processing            system 3 imposes it, an imposed functionality is executed in            the unit 6, so that said portion is executed correctly and            that, consequently, the protected software 2 p is completely            functional,        -   in the absence of the unit 6 and in spite of the request by            a portion of the first execution part 2 pes to execute a            functionality in the unit 6, said request cannot be            fulfilled correctly, so that at least said portion is not            executed correctly and that consequently, the protected            software 2 p is not completely functional,    -   and possibly of a phase of refilling R during which is credited        at least one additional usage of a functionality protected by        the implementation of the second preferred variant embodiment of        the principle of protection by detection and coercion using as        characteristic, a variable of measurement.

The protection phase P can be split into two protection sub-phases P₁and P₂. The first one, called prior protection sub-phase P₁, takes placeindependently of the vulnerable software 2 v to protect. The second one,called subsequent protection sub-phase P₂ is dependent of the vulnerablesoftware 2 v to protect. It should be observed that the prior protectionsub-phase P₁ and the subsequent protection sub-phase P₂ can be carriedout advantageously by two different persons or two different teams. Forinstance, the prior protection sub-phase P₁ can be carried out by aperson or a company providing the development of software protectionsystems, while the subsequent protection sub-phase P₂ can be carried outby a person or a company providing the development of software requiringto be protected. Naturally, it is clear that the prior protectionsub-phase P₁ and the subsequent protection sub-phase P₂ can also becarried out by the same person or team.

The prior protection sub-phase P₁ is composed of several stages S₁₁, . .. , S_(1i) for each of which various tasks or jobs are to be carriedout.

The first stage of this prior protection sub-phase P₁ is called“definitions stage S₁₁”. During this definitions stage S₁₁:

-   -   are chosen:        -   the type of the unit 6. As an illustrative example, can be            chosen as unit 6, a chip card reader 8 and the chip card 7            associated to the reader,        -   and the transfer means 12, 13 designed to be implemented            respectively in the data processing system 3 and in the unit            6, during the usage phase U and capable of providing the            transfer of data between the data processing system 3 and            the unit 6,    -   are defined:        -   a set of elementary functions whose elementary functions are            liable to be executed in a unit 6,        -   and a set of elementary commands for said set of elementary            functions, said elementary commands being liable to be            executed in the data processing system 3 and to trigger the            execution in a unit 6, of the elementary functions,    -   and in the case where the protection process according to the        invention implements the principle of protection by detection        and coercion, are also defined:        -   at least one software execution characteristic, liable to be            monitored at least in part in the unit 6,        -   at least one criterion to abide by for at least one software            execution characteristic,        -   detection means 17 to implement in the unit 6 and enabling            to detect that at least one software execution            characteristic does not abide by at least one associated            criterion,        -   and coercion means 18 to implement in the unit 6 and            enabling to inform the data processing system 3 and/or            modify the execution of a software, when at least one            criterion is not abided by,    -   and in the case where the protection process according to the        invention implements the principle of protection by detection        and coercion using as characteristic a variable of measurement        of the software execution, are also defined:        -   as software execution characteristic liable to be monitored,            a variable of measurement of the usage of a functionality of            a software,        -   as criterion to abide by, at least one threshold associated            to each variable of measurement,        -   and actualization means enabling to update at least one            variable of measurement,    -   and in the case where the protection process according to the        invention also implements a first preferred variant embodiment        of the principle of protection by detection and coercion using        as characteristic a variable of measurement of the software        execution, are also defined:        -   for at least one variable of measurement, several associated            thresholds,        -   and different coercion means corresponding to each of said            thresholds,    -   and in the case where the protection process according to the        invention implements a second preferred variant embodiment of        the principle of protection by detection and coercion using as        characteristic a variable of measurement of the software        execution, are also defined refilling means enabling to add at        least one additional usage to at least one software        functionality monitored by a variable of measurement,    -   and in the case where the protection process according to the        invention implements the principle of protection by detection        and coercion using as characteristic a profile of software        usage, are also defined:        -   as software execution characteristic liable to be monitored,            a profile of software usage,        -   and as criterion to abide by, at least one feature of            software execution,    -   and in the case where the protection process according to the        invention implements the principle of protection by detection        and coercion using as feature of execution to abide by, the        monitoring of the execution chaining, are also defined:        -   an instructions set whose instructions are liable to be            executed in the unit 6,        -   a set of instructions commands for said instructions set,            said instructions commands being liable to be executed in            the data processing system 3 and to trigger in the unit 6            the execution of the instructions,        -   as profile of usage, the chaining of the instructions,        -   as feature of execution, an expected chaining for the            execution of the instructions,        -   as detection means 17, means enabling to detect that the            chaining of the instructions does not correspond to the            expected one,        -   and as coercion means 18, means enabling to inform the data            processing system 3 and/or to modify the functioning of the            portion of protected software 2 p when the chaining of the            instructions does not correspond to the expected one,    -   and in the case where the protection process according to the        invention implements a preferred variant embodiment of the        principle of protection by detection and coercion using as        feature of execution to abide by, the monitoring of the        execution chaining, are also defined:        -   as instructions set, an instructions set whose at least some            instructions work with registers and use at least one            operand with the intention of returning a result,        -   for at least some of the instructions working with            registers:            -   a part PF defining the functionality of the instruction,            -   and a part defining the expected chaining for the                execution of the instructions and including bits fields                corresponding to:                -   an identification field of the instruction CII,                -   and for each operand of the instruction:                -    a flag field CD_(k),                -    and an expected identification field CIP_(k) of the                    operand,        -   for each register belonging to the exploitation means and            used by the instructions set, a generated identification            field CIG_(v) in which is automatically memorized the            identification of the last instruction which has returned            its result in said register,        -   as detection means 17, means enabling, during the execution            of an instruction, for each operand, when the flag field            CD_(k) imposes it, to check the equality of the generated            identification field CIG_(v) corresponding to the register            used by said operand, and the expected identification field            CIP_(k) of the origin of said operand,        -   and as coercion means 18, means enabling to modify the            result of the instructions, if at least one of the checked            equalities is false.    -   and in the case where the protection process according to the        invention implements the principle of protection by renaming,        are also defined:        -   as a triggering command, an elementary command or an            instruction command,        -   as a dependent function, an elementary function or an            instruction,        -   as an order, at least one argument for a triggering command,            corresponding at least in part to the information            transmitted by the data processing system 3 to the unit 6,            so as to trigger the execution of the corresponding            dependent function,        -   a method of renaming of the orders enabling to rename the            orders so as to obtain triggering commands with renamed            orders,        -   and restoring means 20 designed to be used in the unit 6            during the usage phase U, and enabling to restore the            dependent function to execute, from the renamed order,    -   and in the case where the protection process according to the        invention implements a variant of the principle of protection by        renaming, is also defined for at least one dependent function, a        family of dependent functions algorithmically equivalent, but        triggered by triggering commands whose renamed orders are        different,    -   and in the case where the protection process according to the        invention implements one of the preferred embodiments of the        variant of the principle of protection by renaming, are also        defined for at least one dependent function, a family of        algorithmically equivalent dependent functions:        -   by concatenating a field of noise to the information            defining the functional part of the dependent function to            execute in the unit 6,        -   or by using the identification field of the instruction CII            and the expected identification fields CIP_(k) of the            operands.    -   and in the case where the protection process according to the        invention implements a preferred variant of the principle of        protection by renaming, are also defined:        -   as method of renaming of the orders, a ciphering method to            cipher the orders,        -   and as restoring means 20, means implementing a deciphering            method to decipher the renamed orders and thus restore the            identity of the dependent functions to execute in the unit            6.

During the prior protection sub-phase P₁, the definitions stage S₁₁ isfollowed by a stage called “construction stage S₁₂”. During such a stageS₁₂, are constructed the transfer means 12, 13 and the exploitationmeans corresponding to the definitions of the definitions stage S₁₁.

During this construction stage S₁₂, are therefore carried out:

-   -   the construction of the transfer means 12, 13 enabling, during        the usage phase U, the transfer of data between the data        processing system 3 and the unit 6,    -   the construction of the exploitation means enabling the unit 6,        during the usage phase U to execute the elementary functions of        the set of elementary functions,    -   and when the principle of protection by detection and coercion        is also implemented, the construction:        -   of the exploitation means enabling the unit 6, during the            usage phase U to also implement the detection means 17 and            the coercion means 18,        -   and possibly of the exploitation means enabling the unit 6,            during the usage phase U to also implement the actualization            means,        -   and possibly of the exploitation means enabling the unit 6,            during the usage phase U to also implement the refilling            means,        -   and possibly of the exploitation means also enabling the            unit 6, during the usage phase U to execute the instructions            of the instructions set,    -   and when the principle of protection by renaming is also        implemented, the construction of the exploitation means enabling        the unit 6, during the usage phase U to also implement the        restoring means.

The construction of the exploitation means is carried out classically,through a program development unit and taking into account thedefinitions intervened in the definitions stages S₁₁. Such a unit isdescribed in the rest of the description in FIG. 110.

During the prior protection sub-phase P₁, the construction stage S₁₂ canbe followed by a stage called “pre-customization stage S₁₃”. During thispre-customization stage S₁₃, at least a part of the transfer means 13and/or the exploitation means are uploaded to at least one blank unit60, with the intention of obtaining at least one pre-customized unit 66.It should be observed that part of the exploitation means, oncetransferred to a pre-customized unit 66, is no longer directlyaccessible outside said pre-customized unit 66. The transfer of theexploitation means to a blank unit 60 can be carried out through anadapted pre-customization unit, which is described in the rest of thedescription in FIG. 120. In the case of a pre-customized unit 66,constituted by a chip card 7 and its reader 8, the pre-customizationconcerns only the chip card 7.

During the prior protection sub-phase P₁, after the definitions stageS₁₁ and, possibly after the construction stage S₁₂, a stage called“tools making stage S₁₄” can take place. During this tools making stageS₁₄ are made tools enabling to help generate protected software orautomate the protection of software. Such tools enable:

-   -   to help choose or to choose automatically in the vulnerable        software 2 v to protect:        -   the algorithmic processing(s) liable to be split into            elementary functions remotable in the unit 6,        -   the portion(s) liable to be modified,        -   and when the principle of protection by variable is also            implemented, the variable(s) liable to be remoted in the            unit 6,        -   and when the principle of protection by detection and            coercion is also implemented, the execution            characteristic(s) to monitor and, possibly, the algorithmic            processing(s) liable to be split into instructions remotable            in the unit 6,        -   and when the principle of protection by renaming is also            implemented, the algorithmic processing(s) liable to be            split into dependent functions remotable in the unit 6 and            for which the orders of the triggering commands can be            renamed,        -   and when the principle of protection by conditional branch            is also implemented, the conditional branch(es) whose            functionality is liable to be remoted in the unit 6,    -   and, possibly, to help generate protected software or to        automate the protection of software.

These different tools can be carried out independently or in combinationand each tool can have various forms, such as for instancepre-processor, assembler, compiler, etc.

The prior protection sub-phase P₁ is followed by a subsequent protectionsub-phase P₂ which depends on the vulnerable software 2 v to protect.This subsequent protection sub-phase P₂ is composed of several stages aswell. The first stage corresponding to the implementation of theprinciple of protection by elementary functions is called “creationstage S₂₁”. During this creation stage S₂₁, the choices made during thedefinition stage S₁₁ are used. With the aid of said choices and possiblyof tools constructed during the tools making stage S₁₄, the protectedsoftware 2 p is created:

-   -   by choosing, at least one algorithmic processing which, during        the execution of the vulnerable software 2 v, uses at least one        operand and enables to obtain at least one result,    -   by choosing at least one portion of the source of the vulnerable        software 2 vs containing at least one chosen algorithmic        processing,    -   by producing a source of the protected software 2 ps from the        source of the vulnerable software 2 vs, by modifying at least        one chosen portion of the source of the vulnerable software 2 vs        to obtain at least one modified portion of the source of the        protected software 2 ps, this modification being such that:        -   during the execution of the protected software 2 p a first            execution part 2 pes is executed in the data processing            system 3 and a second execution part 2 peu is executed in a            unit 6, obtained from the blank unit 60 after upload of            information,        -   the second execution part 2 peu executes at least the            functionality of at least one chosen algorithmic processing,        -   at least one chosen algorithmic processing is split so that            during the execution of the protected software 2 p, said            algorithmic processing is executed by means of the second            execution part 2 peu, using elementary functions,        -   for at least one chosen algorithmic processing, elementary            commands are integrated to the source of the protected            software 2 ps, so that during the execution of the protected            software 2 p, each elementary command is executed by the            first execution part 2 pes and triggers in the unit 6, the            execution by means of the second execution part 2 peu, of an            elementary function,        -   and a sequence of the elementary commands is chosen among            the set of sequences allowing the execution of the protected            software 2 p,    -   and by producing:        -   a first object part 2 pos of the protected software 2 p,            from the source of the protected software 2 ps, said first            object part 2 pos being such that during the execution of            the protected software 2 p, appears a first execution part 2            pes which is executed in the data processing system 3 and            whose at least a portion takes into account that the            elementary commands are executed according to the chosen            sequence,        -   and a second object part 2 pou of the protected software 2            p, containing the exploitation means, said second object            part 2 pou being such that, after upload to the blank unit            60 and during the execution of the protected software 2 p,            appears the second execution part 2 peu by means of which            are executed the elementary functions triggered by the first            execution part 2 pes.

Naturally, the principle of protection by elementary functions accordingto the invention can be applied directly during the development of a newsoftware without requiring the prior realization of a vulnerablesoftware 2 v. In this way, a protected software 2 p is obtaineddirectly.

During the subsequent protection sub-phase P₂, and when at least anotherprinciple of protection is applied in addition to the principle ofprotection by elementary functions, a “modification stage S₂₂” takesplace. During this modification stage S₂₂, are used the definitionsintervened in the definitions stage S₁₁. Using said definitions andpossibly tools constructed during the tools making stage S₁₄, theprotected software 2 p is modified to allow the implementation of theprinciples of protection according to one of the arrangements herebeforedefined.

When the principle of protection by variable is implemented, theprotected software 2 p is modified:

-   -   by choosing at least one variable used in at least one chosen        algorithmic processing, which during the execution of the        protected software 2 p, partially defines the state of the        protected software 2 p,    -   by modifying at least one chosen portion of the source of the        protected software 2 ps, this modification being such that        during the execution of the protected software 2 p, at least one        chosen variable or at least one copy of chosen variable resides        in the unit 6,    -   and by producing:        -   the first object part 2 pos of the protected software 2 p,            said first object part 2 pos being such that during the            execution of the protected software 2 p, at least one            portion of the first execution part 2 pes takes also into            account that at least one variable or at least one copy of            variable resides in the unit 6,        -   and the second object part 2 pou of the protected software 2            p, said second object part 2 pou being such that, after            upload to the unit 6 and during the execution of the            protected software 2 p, appears the second execution part 2            peu by means of which at least one chosen variable, or at            least one copy of chosen variable resides too in the unit 6.

When the principle of protection by detection and coercion isimplemented, the protected software 2 p is modified:

-   -   by choosing at least one software execution characteristic to        monitor, among the software execution characteristics liable to        be monitored,    -   by choosing at least one criterion to abide by for at least one        chosen software execution characteristic,    -   by choosing in the source of the protected software 2 ps,        elementary functions for which at least one chosen software        execution characteristic is to be monitored,    -   by modifying at least one chosen portion of the source of the        protected software 2 ps, this modification being such that        during the execution of the protected software 2 p, at least one        chosen execution characteristic is monitored by means of the        second execution part 2 peu, and the fact that a criterion is        not abided by leads to the data processing system 3 being        informed and/or to a modification of the execution of the        protected software 2 p,    -   and by producing the second object part 2 pou of the protected        software 2 p containing the exploitation means also implementing        the detection means 17 and the coercion means 18, said second        object part 2 pou being such that, after upload to the unit 6        and during the execution of the protected software 2 p, at least        one software execution characteristic is monitored and the fact        that a criterion is not abided by leads to the data processing        system 3 being informed and/or to a modification of the        execution of the protected software 2 p.

For the implementation of the principle of protection by detection andcoercion using as characteristic a variable of measurement of thesoftware execution, the protected software 2 p is modified:

-   -   by choosing as software execution characteristic to monitor, at        least one variable of measurement of the usage of at least one        functionality of a software,    -   by choosing:        -   at least one functionality of the protected software 2 p            whose usage is liable to be monitored using a variable of            measurement,        -   at least one variable of measurement used to quantify the            usage of said functionality,        -   at least one threshold associated to a chosen variable of            measurement corresponding to a limit of usage of said            functionality,        -   and at least one method of update of a chosen variable of            measurement depending on the usage of said functionality,    -   and by modifying at least one chosen portion of the source of        the protected software 2 ps, this modification being such that,        during the execution of the protected software 2 p, the variable        of measurement is actualized by means of the second execution        part 2 peu depending on the usage of said functionality, and at        least one threshold crossing is taken into account.

For the implementation of a first preferred variant embodiment of theprinciple of protection by detection and coercion using, ascharacteristic, a variable of measurement, the protected software 2 p ismodified:

-   -   by choosing in the source of the protected software 2 ps, at        least one chosen variable of measurement to which must be        associated several thresholds corresponding to different limits        of usage of the functionality,    -   by choosing at least two thresholds associated to the chosen        variable of measurement,    -   and by modifying at least one chosen portion of the source of        the protected software 2 ps, this modification being such that,        during the execution of the protected software 2 p, the        crossings of the various thresholds are taken into account        differently, by means of the second execution part 2 peu.

For the implementation of a second preferred variant embodiment of theprinciple of protection by detection and coercion using ascharacteristic, a variable of measurement, the protected software 2 p ismodified:

-   -   by choosing in the source of the protected software 2 ps, at        least one chosen variable of measurement enabling to limit the        usage of a functionality and which must be able to be credited        with at least one additional usage,    -   and by modifying at least one chosen portion, this modification        being such that during a phase called of refilling, at least one        additional usage of at least one functionality corresponding to        a chosen variable of measurement can be credited.

For the implementation of the principle of protection by detection andcoercion using as characteristic, a profile of software usage, theprotected software 2 p is modified:

-   -   by choosing as software execution characteristic to monitor at        least one profile of software usage,    -   by choosing at least one feature of execution by which at least        one chosen profile of usage must abide,    -   and by modifying at least one chosen portion of the source of        the protected software 2 ps, this modification being such that,        during the execution of the protected software 2 p, the second        execution part 2 peu abides by all the chosen features of        execution.

For the implementation of the principle of protection by detection andcoercion using as feature of execution to abide by, the monitoring ofthe execution chaining, the protected software 2 p is modified:

-   -   by modifying at least one chosen portion of the source of the        protected software 2 ps:        -   by transforming the elementary functions into instructions,        -   by specifying the chaining by which must abide at least some            of the instructions during their execution in the unit 6,        -   and by transforming the elementary commands into            instructions commands corresponding to the instructions            used.

When the principle of protection by renaming is implemented, theprotected software 2 p is modified:

-   -   by choosing in the source of the protected software 2 ps,        triggering commands,    -   by modifying at least one chosen portion of the source of the        protected software 2 ps by renaming the orders of the chosen        triggering commands, so as to conceal the identity of the        corresponding dependent functions,    -   and by producing:        -   the first object part 2 pos of the protected software 2 p,            said first object part 2 pos being such that during the            execution of the protected software 2 p, the triggering            commands with renamed orders are executed,        -   and the second object part 2 pou of the protected software 2            p containing the exploitation means also implementing the            restoring means 20, said second object part 2 pou being such            that, after upload to the unit 6 and during the execution of            the protected software 2 p, the identity of the dependent            functions whose execution is triggered by the first            execution part 2 pes is restored by means of the second            execution part 2 peu, and the dependent functions are            executed by means of the second execution part 2 peu.

For the implementation of a variant of the principle of protection byrenaming, the protected software 2 p is modified:

-   -   by choosing, in the source of the protected software 2 ps at        least one triggering command with renamed order,    -   and by modifying at least one chosen portion of the source of        the protected software 2 ps by replacing at least the renamed        order of one chosen triggering command with renamed order, with        another renamed order, triggering a dependent function of the        same family.

When the principle of protection by conditional branch is implemented,the protected software 2 p is modified:

-   -   by choosing, in the source of the protected software 2 ps, at        least one conditional branch carried out in at least one chosen        algorithmic processing,    -   by modifying at least one chosen portion of the source of the        protected software 2 ps, this modification being such that        during the execution of the protected software 2 p, the        functionality of at least one chosen conditional branch is        executed, by means of the second execution part 2 peu, in the        unit 6,    -   and by producing:        -   the first object part 2 pos of the protected software 2 p,            said first object part 2 pos being such that during the            execution of the protected software 2 p, the functionality            of at least one chosen conditional branch is executed in the            unit 6,        -   and the second object part 2 pou of the protected software 2            p, said second object part 2 pou being such that, after            upload to the unit 6 and during the execution of the            protected software 2 p, appears the second execution part 2            peu by means of which the functionality of at least one            chosen conditional branch is executed.

For the implementation of a preferred embodiment of the principle ofprotection by conditional branch, the protected software 2 p ismodified:

-   -   by choosing, in the source of the protected software 2 ps, at        least one series of chosen conditional branches,    -   by modifying at least one chosen portion of the source of the        protected software 2 ps, this modification being such that        during the execution of the protected software 2 p, the overall        functionality of at least one chosen series of conditional        branches is executed, by means of the second execution part 2        peu, in the unit 6,    -   and by producing:        -   the first object part 2 pos of the protected software 2 p,            said first object part 2 pos being such that during the            execution of the protected software 2 p, the functionality            of at least one chosen series of conditional branches is            executed in the unit 6,        -   and the second object part 2 pou of the protected software 2            p, said second object part 2 pou being such that, after            upload to the unit 6 and during the execution of the            protected software 2 p, appears the second execution part 2            peu by means of which the overall functionality of at least            one chosen series of conditional branches is executed.

Naturally, the principles of protection according to the invention canbe applied directly during the development of a new software withoutrequiring the prior carrying out of intermediate protected pieces ofsoftware. In this way, the creation stage S₂₁ and the modification stageS₂₂ can be carried out concomitantly so as to obtain directly theprotected software 2 p.

During the subsequent protection sub-phase P₂, after the creation stageS₂₁ of the protected software 2 p, and possibly after the modificationstage S₂₂, a stage called “customization stage S₂₃” takes place. Duringthis customization stage S₂₃, the second object part 2 pou containingthe exploitation means is uploaded to at least one blank unit 60, withthe intention of obtaining at least one unit 6, or a part of the secondobject part 2 pou possibly containing the exploitation means is uploadedto at least one pre-customized unit 66, with the intention of obtainingat least one unit 6. The uploading of this customization informationenables to make operational at least one unit 6. It should be observedthat part of said information, once transferred to a unit 6, is notdirectly accessible outside said unit 6. The transfer of thecustomization information to a blank unit 60 or a pre-customized unit 66can be carried out through an adapted customization unit which isdescribed in the rest of the description in FIG. 150. In the case of aunit 6, constituted by a chip card 7 and its reader 8, the customizationconcerns only the chip card 7.

For the implementation of the protection phase P, various technicalmeans are described more precisely in relation to FIGS. 110, 120, 130,140 and 150.

FIG. 110 illustrates an embodiment of a system 25 enabling to implementthe construction stage S₁₂ which takes into account the definitionsintervened during the definitions stage S₁₁ and during which areconstructed the transfer means 12, 13 and possibly, the exploitationmeans intended for the unit 6. Such a system 25 includes a programdevelopment unit or workstation which has classically the form of acomputer comprising a system unit, a screen, peripherals such askeyboard-mouse, and including, among others, the following programs:file editors, assemblers, pre-processors, compilers, interpreters,debuggers and link editors.

FIG. 120 illustrates an embodiment of a pre-customization unit 30enabling to upload at least in part the transfer means 13 and/or theexploitations means to at least one blank unit 60 with the intention ofobtaining a pre-customized unit 66. Said pre-customization unit 30includes reading and writing means 31 enabling to electricallypre-customize, a blank unit 60 so as to obtain a pre-customized unit 66to which the transfer means 13 and/or the exploitations means have beenuploaded. The pre-customization unit 30 can also include physicalcustomization means 32 of the blank unit 60 which can for instance, havethe form of a printer. In the case where the unit 6 is constituted by achip card 7 and its reader 8, the pre-customization generally concernsonly the chip card 7.

FIG. 130 illustrates an embodiment of a system 35 enabling to carry outthe making of the tools enabling to help generate protected software orto automate software protection. Such a system 35 includes a programdevelopment unit or workstation which has classically the form of acomputer comprising a system unit, a screen, peripherals such askeyboard-mouse, and including, among others, the following programs:file editors, assemblers, pre-processors, compilers, interpreters,debuggers and link editors.

FIG. 140 illustrates an embodiment of a system 40 enabling to createdirectly a protected software 2 p or to modify a vulnerable software 2 vwith the intention of obtaining a protected software 2 p. Such a system40 includes a program development unit or workstation which hasclassically the form of a computer comprising a system unit, a screen,peripherals such as keyboard-mouse, and including, among others, thefollowing programs: file editors, assemblers, pre-processors, compilers,interpreters, debuggers and link editors, as well as tools enabling tohelp generate protected software or to automate software protection.

FIG. 150 illustrates an embodiment of a customization unit 45 enablingto upload the second object part 2 pou to at least one blank unit 60with the intention of obtaining at least one unit 6 or to upload a partof the second object part 2 pou to at least one pre-customized unit 66with the intention of obtaining at least one unit 6. Said customizationunit 45 includes reading and writing means 46 enabling to electricallycustomize, at least one blank unit 60 or at least one pre-customizedunit 66, so as to obtain at least one unit 6. At the close of thiscustomization, a unit 6 includes the information necessary to theexecution of the protected software 2 p. The customization unit 45 canalso include physical customization means 47 for at least one unit 6which can for instance, have the form of a printer. In the case where aunit 6 is constituted by a chip card 7 and its reader 8, thecustomization generally concerns only the chip card 7.

The protection process according to the invention can be implementedwith the following improvements:

-   -   It can be planned to use jointly several processing and        memorizing units between which is divided out the second object        part 2 pou of the protected software 2 p so that their joint use        enables to execute the protected software 2 p, the absence of at        least one of said processing and memorizing units preventing the        usage of the protected software 2 p.    -   In the same way, after the pre-customization stage S₁₃ and        during customization stage S₂₃, the part of the second object        part 2 pou necessary to transform the pre-customized unit 66        into a unit 6 can be contained in a processing and memorizing        unit used by the customization unit 45 so as to limit the access        to said part of the second object part 2 pou. Naturally, said        part of the second object part 2 pou can be divided out between        several processing and memorizing units so that said part of the        second object part 2 pou is accessible only during the joint use        of said processing and memorizing units.

1. Process to protect, using at least one blank unit (60) including atleast memorization means (15) and processing means (16), a vulnerablesoftware (2 v) against its unauthorized usage, said vulnerable software(2 v) being produced from a source (2 vs) and working on a dataprocessing system (3), said protection process comprising: during aprotection phase (P): defining: a set of elementary functions whoseelementary functions are liable to be executed in a unit (6), and a setof elementary commands for said set of elementary functions, saidelementary commands being liable to be executed in the data processingsystem (3) and to trigger the execution in a unit (6), of the elementaryfunctions, constructing exploitation means enabling to transform theblank unit (60) into a unit (6) able to execute the elementary functionsof said set, the execution of said elementary functions being triggeredby the execution in the data processing system (3), of the elementarycommands, creating a protected software (2 p): by choosing, at least onealgorithmic processing which, during the execution of the vulnerablesoftware (2 v), uses at least one operand and enables to obtain at leastone result, by choosing at least one portion of the source of thevulnerable software (2 vs) containing at least one chosen algorithmicprocessing, by producing a source of the protected software (2 ps) fromthe source of the vulnerable software (2 vs), by modifying at least onechosen portion of the source of the vulnerable software (2 vs) to obtainat least one modified portion of the source of the protected software (2ps), this modification being such that: during the execution of theprotected software (2 p) a first execution part (2 pes) is executed inthe data processing system (3) and a second execution part (2 peu) isexecuted in a unit (6), obtained from the blank unit (60) after uploadof information, the second execution part (2 peu) executes at least thefunctionality of at least one chosen algorithmic processing, at leastone chosen algorithmic processing is split so that during the executionof the protected software (2 p), said algorithmic processing is executedby means of the second execution part (2 peu), using elementaryfunctions, for at least one chosen algorithmic processing, elementarycommands are integrated to the source of the protected software (2 ps),so that during the execution of the protected software (2 p), eachelementary command is executed by the first execution part (2 pes) andtriggers in the unit (6), the execution by means of the second executionpart (2 peu), of an elementary function, and a sequence of theelementary commands is chosen among the set of sequences allowing theexecution of the protected software (2 p), and by producing: a firstobject part (2 pos) of the protected software (2 p), from the source ofthe protected software (2 ps), said first object part (2 pos) being suchthat during the execution of the protected software (2 p), appears afirst execution part (2 pes) which is executed in the data processingsystem (3) and whose at least a portion takes into account that theelementary commands are executed according to the chosen sequence, and asecond object part (2 pou) of the protected software (2 p), containingthe exploitation means, said second object part (2 pou) being such that,after upload to the blank unit (60) and during the execution of theprotected software (2 p), appears the second execution part (2 peu) bymeans of which are executed the elementary functions triggered by thefirst execution part (2 pes), and uploading the second object part (2pou) to the blank unit (60), with the intention of obtaining the unit(6), and during a usage phase (U) during which the protected software (2p) is executed: in the presence of the unit (6) and each time anelementary command contained in a portion of the first execution part (2pes) imposes it, executing the corresponding elementary function in theunit (6), so that said portion is executed correctly and that,consequently, the protected software (2 p) is completely functional, andin the absence of the unit (6), in spite of the request by a portion ofthe first execution part (2 pes) to trigger the execution of anelementary function in the unit (6), not being able to fulfill saidrequest correctly, so that at least said portion is not executedcorrectly and that, consequently, the protected software (2 p) is notcompletely functional, wherein the process further comprises: during theprotection phase (P): defining:  at least one software executioncharacteristic, liable to be monitored at least in part in the unit (6), at least one criterion to abide by for at least one software executioncharacteristic, detection means (17) to implement in the unit (6) andenabling to detect that at least one software execution characteristicdoes not abide by at least one associated criterion, and coercion means(18) to implement in the unit (6) and enabling to inform the dataprocessing system (3) and/or modify the execution of a software, when atleast one criterion is not abided by, constructing the exploitationmeans enabling the unit (6), to also implement the detection means (17)and the coercion means (18), and modifying the protected software (2 p):by choosing at least one software execution characteristic to monitor,among the software execution characteristics liable to be monitored, bychoosing at least one criterion to abide by for at least one chosensoftware execution characteristic, by choosing in the source of theprotected software (2 ps), elementary functions for which at least onechosen software execution characteristic is to be monitored, bymodifying at least one chosen portion of the source of the protectedsoftware (2 ps), this modification being such that during the executionof the protected software (2 p), at least one chosen executioncharacteristic is monitored by means of the second execution part (2peu), and the fact that a criterion is not abided by leads to the dataprocessing system (3) being informed and/or to a modification of theexecution of the protected software (2 p), and by producing the secondobject part (2 pou) of the protected software (2 p) containing theexploitation means also implementing the detection means (17) and thecoercion means (18), said second object part (2 pou) being such that,after upload to the unit (6) and during the execution of the protectedsoftware (2 p), at least one software execution characteristic ismonitored and the fact that a criterion is not abided by leads to thedata processing system (3) being informed and/or to a modification ofthe execution of the protected software (2 p), and during the usagephase (U): in the presence of the unit (6): as long as all the criteriacorresponding to all the monitored execution characteristics of all themodified portions of the protected software (2 p) are abided by,enabling said portions of the protected software (2 p) to work nominallyand consequently enabling the protected software (2 p) to worknominally, and if at least one of the criteria corresponding to amonitored execution characteristic of a portion of the protectedsoftware (2 p) is not abided by, informing the data processing system(3) of it and/or modifying the functioning of the portion of theprotected software (2 p), so that the functioning of the protectedsoftware (2 p) is modified, wherein the process further comprises:during the protection phase (P): defining: as software executioncharacteristic liable to be monitored, a profile of software usage, andas criterion to abide by, at least one feature of software execution,and modifying the protected software (2 p):  by choosing as softwareexecution characteristic to monitor at least one profile of softwareusage,  by choosing at least one feature of execution by which at leastone chosen profile of usage must abide, and  by modifying at least onechosen portion of the source of the protected software (2 ps), thismodification being such that, during the execution of the protectedsoftware (2 p), the second execution part (2 peu) abides by all thechosen features of execution, and during the usage phase (U) in thepresence of the unit (6), and in the case where it is detected that atleast one feature of execution is not abided by, informing the dataprocessing system (3) of it and/or modifying the functioning of theportion of the protected software (2 p), so that the functioning of theprotected software (2 p) is modified, wherein the process furthercomprises: during the protection phase (P): defining: an instructionsset whose instructions are liable to be executed in the unit (6), a setof instructions commands for said instructions set, said instructionscommands being liable to be executed in the data processing system (3)and to trigger in the unit (6) the execution of the instructions, asprofile of usage, the chaining of the instructions, as feature ofexecution, an expected chaining for the execution of the instructions,as detection means (17), means enabling to detect that the chaining ofthe instructions does not correspond to the expected one, and ascoercion means (18), means enabling to inform the data processing system(3) and/or to modify the functioning of the portion of protectedsoftware (2 p) when the chaining of the instructions does not correspondto the expected one, constructing the exploitation means also enablingthe unit (6) to execute the instructions of the instructions set, theexecution of said instructions being triggered by the execution in thedata processing system (3), of the instructions commands, and modifyingthe protected software (2 p): by modifying at least one chosen portionof the source of the protected software (2 ps): by transforming theelementary functions into instructions, by specifying the chaining bywhich must abide at least some of the instructions during theirexecution in the unit (6), and by transforming the elementary commandsinto instructions commands corresponding to the instructions used, andduring the usage phase (U), in the presence of the unit (6), in the casewhere it is detected that the chaining of the instructions executed inthe unit (6) does not correspond to the expected one, informing the dataprocessing system (3) of it and/or modifying the functioning of theportion of the protected software (2 p), so that the functioning of theprotected software (2 p) is modified, and wherein the process furthercomprises: during the protection phase (P): defining: as instructionsset, an instructions set whose at least some instructions work withregisters and use at least one operand with the intention of returning aresult, for at least some of the instructions working with registers: apart (PF) defining the functionality of the instruction, and a partdefining the expected chaining for the execution of the instructions andincluding bits fields corresponding to:  an identification field of theinstruction (CII), and  for each operand of the instruction:  a flagfield (CDk), and  an expected identification field (CIPk) of theoperand,  for each register belonging to the exploitation means and usedby the instructions set, a generated identification field (CIGv) inwhich is automatically memorized the identification of the lastinstruction which has returned its result in said register, as detectionmeans (17), means enabling, during the execution of an instruction, foreach operand, when the flag field (CDk) imposes it, to check theequality of the generated identification field (CIGv) corresponding tothe register used by said operand, and the expected identification field(CIPk) of the origin of said operand, and as coercion means (18), meansenabling to modify the result of the instructions, if at least one ofthe checked equalities is false.
 2. Process according to claim 1,comprising: during the protection phase (P): modifying the protectedsoftware (2 p): by choosing at least one variable used in at least onechosen algorithmic processing, which during the execution of theprotected software (2 p), partially defines the state of the protectedsoftware (2 p), by modifying at least one chosen portion of the sourceof the protected software (2 ps), this modification being such thatduring the execution of the protected software (2 p), at least onechosen variable or at least one copy of chosen variable resides in theunit (6), and by producing: the first object part (2 pos) of theprotected software (2 p), said first object part (2 pos) being such thatduring the execution of the protected software (2 p), at least oneportion of the first execution part (2 pes) takes also into account thatat least one variable or at least one copy of variable resides in theunit (6), and the second object part (2 pou) of the protected software(2 p), said second object part (2 pou) being such that, after upload tothe unit (6) and during the execution of the protected software (2 p),appears the second execution part (2 peu) by means of which at least onechosen variable, or at least one copy of chosen variable resides too inthe unit (6), and during the usage phase (U): in the presence of theunit (6) each time a portion of the first execution part (2 pes) imposesit, using a variable or a copy of variable residing in the unit (6), sothat said portion is executed correctly and that, consequently, theprotected software (2 p) is completely functional, and in the absence ofthe unit (6), in spite of the request by a portion of the firstexecution part (2 pes) to use a variable or a copy of variable residingin the unit (6), not being able to fulfill said request correctly, sothat at least said portion is not executed correctly and that,consequently the protected software (2 p) is not completely functional.3. Process according to claim 1, to limit usage of a protected software(2 p), comprising: during the protection phase (P): defining: assoftware execution characteristic liable to be monitored, a variable ofmeasurement of the usage of a functionality of a software, as criterionto abide by, at least one threshold associated to each variable ofmeasurement, and actualization means enabling to update at least onevariable of measurement, constructing the exploitation means enablingthe unit (6) to also implement the actualization means, and modifyingthe protected software (2 p): by choosing as software executioncharacteristic to monitor, at least one variable of measurement of theusage of at least one functionality of a software, by choosing: at leastone functionality of the protected software (2 p) whose usage is liableto be monitored using a variable of measurement, at least one variableof measurement used to quantify the usage of said functionality, atleast one threshold associated to a chosen variable of measurementcorresponding to a limit of usage of said functionality, and at leastone method of update of a chosen variable of measurement depending onthe usage of said functionality, and by modifying at least one chosenportion of the source of the protected software (2 ps), thismodification being such that, during the execution of the protectedsoftware (2 p), the variable of measurement is actualized by means ofthe second execution part (2 peu) depending on the usage of saidfunctionality, and at least one threshold crossing is taken intoaccount, and during the usage phase (U), in the presence of the unit(6), and in the case where at least one threshold crossing correspondingto at least one limit of usage is detected, informing the dataprocessing system (3) of it and/or modifying the functioning of theportion of the protected software (2 p), so that the functioning of theprotected software (2 p) is modified.
 4. Process according to claim 3,comprising: during the protection phase (P): defining: for at least onevariable of measurement, several associated thresholds, and differentcoercion means corresponding to each of said thresholds, and modifyingthe protected software (2 p): by choosing in the source of the protectedsoftware (2 ps), at least one chosen variable of measurement to whichmust be associated several thresholds corresponding to different limitsof usage of the functionality, by choosing at least two thresholdsassociated to the chosen variable of measurement, and by modifying atleast one chosen portion of the source of the protected software (2 ps),this modification being such that, during the execution of the protectedsoftware (2 p), the crossings of the various thresholds are taken intoaccount differently, by means of the second execution part (2 peu), andduring the usage phase (U): in the presence of the unit (6): in the casewhere the crossing of a first threshold is detected, enjoining theprotected software (2 p) not to use the corresponding functionalityanymore, and in the case where the crossing of a second threshold isdetected, making ineffective the corresponding functionality and/or atleast one portion of the protected software (2 p).
 5. Process accordingto claim 3, comprising: during the protection phase (P): definingrefilling means enabling to credit at least one software functionalitymonitored by a variable of measurement with at least one additionalusage, constructing the exploitation means also allowing the unit (6) toimplement the refilling means, and modifying the protected software (2p): by choosing in the source of the protected software (2 ps), at leastone chosen variable of measurement enabling to limit the usage of afunctionality and which must be able to be credited with at least oneadditional usage, and by modifying at least one chosen portion, thismodification being such that during a phase called of refilling, atleast one additional usage of at least one functionality correspondingto a chosen variable of measurement can be credited, and during thephase of refilling: reactualizing at least one chosen variable ofmeasurement and/or at least one associated threshold, so as to allow atleast one additional usage of the functionality.
 6. Process according toclaim 1 comprising: during the protection phase (P): defining: as atriggering command, an elementary command, as a dependent function, anelementary function, as an order, at least one argument for a triggeringcommand, corresponding at least in part to the information transmittedby the data processing system (3) to the unit (6), so as to trigger theexecution of the corresponding dependent function, a method of renamingof the orders enabling to rename the orders so as to obtain triggeringcommands with renamed orders, and restoring means (20) designed to beused in the unit (6) during the usage phase (U), and enabling to restorethe dependent function to execute, from the renamed order, constructingexploitation means enabling the unit (6) to also implement the restoringmeans, and modifying the protected software (2 p): by choosing in thesource of the protected software (2 ps), triggering commands, bymodifying at least one chosen portion of the source of the protectedsoftware (2 ps) by renaming the orders of the chosen triggeringcommands, so as to conceal the identity of the corresponding dependentfunctions, and by producing: the first object part (2 pos) of theprotected software (2 p), said first object part (2 pos) being such thatduring the execution of the protected software (2 p), the triggeringcommands with renamed orders are executed, and the second object part (2pou) of the protected software (2 p) containing the exploitation meansalso implementing the restoring means (20), said second object part (2pou) being such that, after upload to the unit (6) and during theexecution of the protected software (2 p), the identity of the dependentfunctions whose execution is triggered by the first execution part (2pes) is restored by means of the second execution part (2 peu), and thedependent functions are executed by means of the second execution part(2 peu), and during the usage phase (U): in the presence of the unit (6)and each time a triggering command with renamed order, contained in aportion of the first execution part (2 pes) imposes it, restoring in theunit (6), the identity of the corresponding dependent function andexecuting it, so that said portion is executed correctly and that,consequently, the protected software (2 p) is completely functional, andin the absence of the unit (6), in spite of the request by a portion ofthe first execution part (2 pes), to trigger the execution of adependent function in the unit (6), not being able to fulfill saidrequest correctly, so that at least said portion is not executedcorrectly and that, consequently, the protected software (2 p) is notcompletely functional.
 7. Process according to claim 6, comprising:during the protection phase (P): defining for at least one dependentfunction, a family of dependent functions algorithmically equivalent,but triggered by triggering commands whose renamed orders are different,and modifying the protected software (2 p): by choosing, in the sourceof the protected software (2 ps) at least one triggering command withrenamed order, and by modifying at least one chosen portion of thesource of the protected software (2 ps) by replacing at least therenamed order of one chosen triggering command with renamed order, withanother renamed order, triggering a dependent function of the samefamily.
 8. Process according to claim 7, comprising: during theprotection phase (P), defining, for at least one dependent function, afamily of algorithmically equivalent dependent functions: byconcatenating a field of noise to the information defining thefunctional part of the dependent function to execute in the unit (6), orby using the identification field of the instruction (CII) and theexpected identification fields (CIPk) of the operands.
 9. Processaccording to claim 6, 7 or 8, comprising: during the protection phase(P): defining: as method of renaming of the orders, a ciphering methodto cipher the orders, and as restoring means (20), means implementing adeciphering method to decipher the renamed orders and thus restore theidentity of the dependent functions to execute in the unit (6). 10.Process according to claim 1 comprising: during the protection phase(P): defining: as a triggering command, an instruction command, as adependent function, an instruction, as an order, at least one argumentfor a triggering command, corresponding at least in part to theinformation transmitted by the data processing system (3) to the unit(6), so as to trigger the execution of the corresponding dependentfunction, a method of renaming of the orders enabling to rename theorders so as to obtain triggering commands with renamed orders, andrestoring means (20) designed to be used in the unit (6) during theusage phase (U), and enabling to restore the dependent function toexecute, from the renamed order, constructing exploitation meansenabling the unit (6) to also implement the restoring means, andmodifying the protected software (2 p): by choosing in the source of theprotected software (2 ps), triggering commands, by modifying at leastone chosen portion of the source of the protected software (2 ps) byrenaming the orders of the chosen triggering commands, so as to concealthe identity of the corresponding dependent functions, and by producing:the first object part (2 pos) of the protected software (2 p), saidfirst object part (2 pos) being such that during the execution of theprotected software (2 p), the triggering commands with renamed ordersare executed, and the second object part (2 pou) of the protectedsoftware (2 p) containing the exploitation means also implementing therestoring means (20), said second object part (2 pou) being such that,after upload to the unit (6) and during the execution of the protectedsoftware (2 p), the identity of the dependent functions whose executionis triggered by the first execution part (2 pes) is restored by means ofthe second execution part (2 peu), and the dependent functions areexecuted by means of the second execution part (2 peu), and during theusage phase (U): in the presence of the unit (6) and each time atriggering command with renamed order, contained in a portion of thefirst execution part (2 pes) imposes it, restoring in the unit (6), theidentity of the corresponding dependent function and executing it, sothat said portion is executed correctly and that, consequently, theprotected software (2 p) is completely functional, and in the absence ofthe unit (6), in spite of the request by a portion of the firstexecution part (2 pes), to trigger the execution of a dependent functionin the unit (6), not being able to fulfill said request correctly, sothat at least said portion is not executed correctly and that,consequently, the protected software (2 p) is not completely functional.11. Process according to claim 10, comprising: during the protectionphase (P): defining for at least one dependent function, a family ofdependent functions algorithmically equivalent, but triggered bytriggering commands whose renamed orders are different, and modifyingthe protected software (2 p): by choosing, in the source of theprotected software (2 ps) at least one triggering command with renamedorder, and by modifying at least one chosen portion of the source of theprotected software (2 ps) by replacing at least the renamed order of onechosen triggering command with renamed order, with another renamedorder, triggering a dependent function of the same family.
 12. Processaccording to claim 11, comprising: during the protection phase (P),defining, for at least one dependent function, a family ofalgorithmically equivalent dependent functions: by concatenating a fieldof noise to the information defining the functional part of thedependent function to execute in the unit (6), or by using theidentification field of the instruction (CII) and the expectedidentification fields (CIPk) of the operands.
 13. Process according toclaim 10, 11 or 12, comprising: during the protection phase (P):defining: as method of renaming of the orders, a ciphering method tocipher the orders, and as restoring means (20), means implementing adeciphering method to decipher the renamed orders and thus restore theidentity of the dependent functions to execute in the unit (6). 14.Process according to one of the claims 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11 or12, comprising: during the protection phase (P): modifying the protectedsoftware (2 p): by choosing, in the source of the protected software (2ps), at least one conditional branch carried out in at least one chosenalgorithmic processing, by modifying at least one chosen portion of thesource of the protected software (2 ps), this modification being suchthat during the execution of the protected software (2 p), thefunctionality of at least one chosen conditional branch is executed, bymeans of the second execution part (2 peu), in the unit (6), and byproducing: the first object part (2 pos) of the protected software (2p), said first object part (2 pos) being such that during the executionof the protected software (2 p), the functionality of at least onechosen conditional branch is executed in the unit (6), and the secondobject part (2 pou) of the protected software (2 p), said second objectpart (2 pou) being such that, after upload to the unit (6) and duringthe execution of the protected software (2 p), appears the secondexecution part (2 peu) by means of which the functionality of at leastone chosen conditional branch is executed, and during the usage phase(U): in the presence of the unit (6) and each time a portion of thefirst execution part (2 pes) imposes it, executing the functionality ofat least one conditional branch in the unit (6), so that said portion isexecuted correctly and that, consequently, the protected software (2 p)is completely functional, and in the absence of the unit (6) and inspite of the request by a portion of the first execution part (2 pes) toexecute the functionality of a conditional branch in the unit (6), notbeing able to fulfill said request correctly, so that at least saidportion is not executed correctly and that consequently, the protectedsoftware (2 p) is not completely functional.
 15. Process according toclaim 14, comprising, during the protection phase (P), modifying theprotected software (2 p): by choosing, in the source of the protectedsoftware (2 ps), at least one series of chosen conditional branches, bymodifying at least one chosen portion of the source of the protectedsoftware (2 ps), this modification being such that during the executionof the protected software (2 p), the overall functionality of at leastone chosen series of conditional branches is executed, by means of thesecond execution part (2 peu), in the unit (6), and by producing: thefirst object part (2 pos) of the protected software (2 p), said firstobject part (2 pos) being such that during the execution of theprotected software (2 p), the functionality of at least one chosenseries of conditional branches is executed in the unit (6), and thesecond object part (2 pou) of the protected software (2 p), said secondobject part (2 pou) being such that, after upload to the unit (6) andduring the execution of the protected software (2 p), appears the secondexecution part (2 peu) by means of which the overall functionality of atleast one chosen series of conditional branches is executed.
 16. Processaccording to one of the claims 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, or 12,comprising splitting the protection phase (P) into a prior protectionsub-phase (P1), independent of the software to protect and a subsequentprotection sub-phase (P2), dependent of the software to protect. 17.Process according to claim 16, comprising, during the prior protectionsub-phase (P1), making intervene a definitions stage (S11) during whichare carried out all the definitions.
 18. Process according to claim 17,comprising, after the definitions stage (S11), making intervene aconstruction stage (S12) during which are constructed the exploitationmeans.
 19. Process according to claim 18, comprising, after theconstruction stage (S12), making intervene a pre-customization stage(S13), comprising uploading to a blank unit (60), at least a part of theexploitation means with the intention of obtaining a pre-customized unit(66).
 20. Process according to claim 19, comprising splitting thesubsequent protection sub-phase (P2), into: a creation stage (S21)during which the protected software (2 p) is created, from thevulnerable software (2 v), possibly, a modification stage (S22) duringwhich the protected software (2 p) is modified, and a customizationstage (S23) during which: the second object part (2 pou) of theprotected software (2 p) containing the exploitation means is uploadedto at least one blank unit (60) with the intention of obtaining at leastone unit (6), or a part of the second object part (2 pou) of theprotected software (2 p) possibly containing the exploitation means isuploaded to at least one pre-customized unit (66) with the intention ofobtaining at least one unit (6).
 21. Process according to claim 20,comprising, during the creation stage (S21) and possibly during themodification stage (S22), using at least one tool which help generateprotected software or which automate software protection.
 22. System forthe implementation of the process in accordance with claim 20,characterized in that it includes a program development unit used tocreate or modify a protected software (2 p).
 23. System for theimplementation of the process in accordance with claim 20, characterizedin that it includes a customization unit (45) enabling to upload: thesecond object part (2 pou) to at least one blank unit (60), with theintention of obtaining at least one unit (6), or a part of the secondobject part (2 pou) to at least one pre-customized unit (66), with theintention of obtaining at least one unit (6).
 24. Unit (6) enabling toexecute a protected software (2 p) and to prevent its unauthorizedusage, characterized in that it contains the second object part (2 pou)of the protected software (2 p) uploaded using a customization unit (45)in accordance with claim
 23. 25. Computer readable storage mediumscontaining a distribution set (2 pd) of a protected software (2 p),characterized in that the distribution set of the protected softwareincludes: a first distribution part (2 pds) containing the first objectpart (2 pos) and designed to work in a data processing system (3), and asecond distribution part (2 pdu) having the form: of a blank unit (60),or of a pre-customized unit (66), able after upload of customizationinformation, to transform into a unit (6) in accordance with claim 24,or of a unit (6) in accordance with claim
 24. 26. Computer readablestorage mediums containing a distribution set (2 pd) of a protectedsoftware (2 p) according to claim 25, characterized in that the firstdistribution part (2 pds) has the form of a physical distributionmedium, a CDROM for instance, or the form of files distributed through anetwork.
 27. Computer readable storage mediums containing a distributionset (2 pd) of a protected software (2 p) according to claim 25,characterized in that the second distribution part (2 pdu), having theform of blank units (60), of pre-customized units (66) or of units (6),includes at least one chip card (7).
 28. Processing and memorizing unitcharacterized in that it contains the part of the second object part (2pou) necessary to transform a pre-customized unit (66) into a unit (6)in accordance with claim
 24. 29. Set of processing and memorizing unitscharacterized in that the processing and memorizing units used jointly,contain the part of the second object part (2 pou) necessary totransform a pre-customized unit (66) into a unit (6) in accordance withclaim
 24. 30. Set of units (6), characterized in that the second objectpart (2 pou) of the protected software (2 p), uploaded using acustomization unit (45) in accordance with claim 23, is divided outbetween several processing and memorizing units so that their joint useenables to execute the protected software (2 p).
 31. System for theimplementation of the process in accordance with claim 19, characterizedin that it includes a pre-customization unit (30) enabling to upload atleast a part of the exploitation means to at least one blank unit (60),with the intention of obtaining at least one pre-customized unit (66).32. Pre-customized unit (66), characterized in that it is obtained bythe system in accordance with claim
 31. 33. System for theimplementation of the process in accordance with claim 18, characterizedin that it includes a program development unit, used, during theconstruction stage (S12), to carry out the construction of theexploitation means intended for the unit (6), taking into account thedefinitions intervened during the definitions stage (S11).
 34. Processaccording to claim 17, comprising, during the prior protection sub-phase(P1), making intervene a tools making stage (S14) during which are madetools enabling to help generate protected software or to automatesoftware protection.
 35. System for the implementation of the process inaccordance with claim 34, characterized in that it includes a programdevelopment unit, used to carry out during the tools making stage (S14),the making of tools which help generate protected software or whichautomate software protection.